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Abstract
This is a survey and analysis-with commentary-of  one of convergence  or divergence.  Very  often the policy
migration  issues and the related  development  policies  for  issues  push one outside what would be narrowly
the sending countries.  "Migration  and development"  is  considered  as "migration studies."  For example, policies
considered an unsettled and unresolved  area for good  to reduce  the brain drain go directly to the issue of
reason. The policy  issues are surprisingly deep and run to  educational  reform  in developing countries  while policies
basic issues  such as the nature of development  as  to increase  the developmental  impact  of remittances
opposed to simple poverty  reduction. North-north  quickly  carry one into the nature  of business
migration (between  industrial countries),  south-south  development  itself.  Ronald Dore's ideas on educational
migration (between  or within  developing countries),  and  reform are  outlined as a policy approach to the brain
north-south migration (from developing  to industrial  drain problem. Jane Jacobs'  ideas on  development  are
countries) are all covered  although the paper focuses on  outlined  in greater  length as they are little known  in
the north-south  variety. Attention is paid to the question  development  economics and yet directly  address the
of the dynamic mechanism  underlying migration being  policy issues raised  by migration and development.
This paper-a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist,  Development Economics-is  part
of a larger effort in the vice presidency  to stay abreast of important development  issues.  Copies of the paper are available
free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Bezawork Mekuria, room MC4-
358, telephone  202-458-2756,  fax 202-522-1158,  email address bmekuria@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working
Papers are  also posted on the  Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  author may  be contacted  at david@ellerman.org.
August 2003.  (63  pages)
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2Introduction: Scope of the Survey
In recent years, the already  sizable literature  on migration issues has grown with an accelerated
pace.  Migration, refugee, and asylum issues have pushed to the top of the policy agenda in
Europe and North America,  and policy research has grown apace.  Our goal is to focus on a
relatively small part of that policy literature that is of special concern to the World Bank and
other development  agencies.  That is the literature on the development impact of (voluntary)
migration in the home countries or regions.  The relationship between international migration
and development  in the home country has been variously called an "unsettled"  [Papademetriou
and Martin 1991] or "unresolved"  [Appleyard  1992] relationship.  In the course of the survey, I
will try to clarify some of the analytical issues and to indicate some of the potentially fruitful
connections between migration research and development policies.
Opening Match: Harry Johnson Versus Don Patinkin
Harry Johnson's "Internationalist"  Model
We might begin with a 1968 debate between two prominent economists,  Harry Johnson and Don
Patinkin, in an early anthology of papers on the "brain drain" [Adams  1968].  Johnson begins
with one of the basic policy questions in the field: better or worse for whom?  Is it the people of
the home country or region (excluding those who might leave or have left) or the people of the
world as a whole?  Or is the policy commitment to a specific place or nation rather than an
identifiable set of people?
Johnson staked out what he called the "cosmopolitan  liberal position" noting that he expected
"many educated international  migrants would share this position"  [Johnson  1968, 70] (Johnson
was a Canadian who taught at the University of Chicago and London School of Economics).
The basic assumption  in this position is that the international flow of human capital is a
beneficial process since "it reflects the free choices of the individuals who choose to migrate"
(Johnson was not commenting on refugees or asylum-seekers).
The policy reference group is the world as a whole.  Most people have a culturally conditioned
attachment to their home country but, in a sense, that is  an artificial path-dependent
phenomenon.  If "the individual [had] been born and grown up in another country"  then he
would have a similar attachment to that other country.  With such "artificial barriers to
migration" in operation, Johnson argued that less migration from low to high income countries
occurs that is "economically optimal."  Hence when such migration does occur, he put the burden
of proof squarely on any argument against the migration being economically beneficial.
Voluntary migration-"like  any profit-motivated  international  movement of factors of
production-may be expected  to raise total world output ... [except]  when the migrant's private
calculation of gain from migration excludes certain social costs that his migration entails."
[Johnson  1968, 75]  Thus Johnson allows for one complication,  namely, externalities which are
not taken into account in the private calculations.  Such externalities  may or may not outweigh
the benefits of the migration.  Since the externalities  associated with the brain drain might
include positive ones in the receiving country as well as negative ones in the sending country,
Johnson makes a primafacie  case that the externalities will to some extent cancel  out and will on
the whole not outweigh the direct benefits to the migrants.
3Even if the benefits overall outweigh the costs in the sense that with compensation  it would be a
Pareto improvement, there is in practice "no articulated machinery for compensation."  There are
remittances  sent back by migrants and possibly return migration, but there is no systematic
mechanism of compensation to the home country.  However,  the whole discussion of
"compensation" tends to slip in an unwarranted  assumption that citizens are "owned"  by their
home country and, thus, that home country is "due" compensation  when citizens migrate.
Setting aside any such assumption,  Johnson does recognize a case where a more plausible
argument might be made.
One case is where the home country financed the higher education of a citizen under at least an
implicit expectation that the individual would then contribute back to the country.  Johnson
suggests that university loans might be a better policy than grants.  Some of the alternatives  such
a period of required service or a tax or bounty paid by the receiving country or employer would
be less in the liberal spirit and would be difficult to enforce internationally.  Overall, he argues
that there is a prima  facie case for the countries of emigration to make it attractive for their
educated citizens to stay (or to get the diaspora productively reinvolved in their home country)-
rather than to expect countries of immigration to pay subsidies or compensation for the people
who freely choose to immigrate.
Commentary on the Cosmopolitan  Liberal Argument
Development as a Multi-Person  Prisoners'  Dilemma Situation
There seem to be two important weaknesses in Johnson's powerful statement of the cosmopolitan
liberal position.  One weakness is his rather implicit assumption that local value-increasing
actions (e.g.,  factor movements) will yield global improvements-perhaps  aside from various
"externalities."  Today, externalities in the form of interdependencies  are seen as being rather
ubiquitous.  Game theory is the theory of interdependent  decision-making.  In the coordination
problems popularized by the prisoners' dilemma game, the individually preferred strategies lead
to an outcome that is Pareto dominated by the cooperative option.
If economic development in a developing country or region was modeled as a multi-person
prisoners' dilemma game [see chapter 7 in Schelling 1978 or Appendix 3 below] where many
people are more socialized or less mobile and thus take the "cooperate" option ("committing to
make home better"), cosmopolitan liberalism would encourage less-socialized and more mobile
people to take the "defect"  option of migration ("exit to find a better home")  because  it would,
indeed, benefit them individually.  Yet, those gains would not be there if everyone defected and
tried to migrate since the doors would close vastly raising the costs of migration (e.g., through
illegal channels) and dissipating the benefits.  All would end up at a low equilibrium,  with
neither the benefits of migration nor development,  dominated by the option where  all cooperated
for development.  In these we're-all-in-this-together  situations, cosmopolitan liberalism does not
seem justified to urge the defection option on the grounds that it would benefit the defectors-so
long as most others don't take that option.
What is Second-Best to Liberalism-Except-for-Labor?
The other major weakness in the cosmopolitan liberal  argument is that in practice  it tends to
argue more for a one-way door for movements in people.  It is used to defend a right of out-
4migration more than a right of in-migration.  It is used to attack countries  trying to limit who
leaves but it is less often used to attack countries trying to limit who comes in-which is taken as
the "proper" exercise of national sovereignty.'  How can cosmopolitan liberalism in developed
countries push for two-way openness in goods and capital but not in people?
So  the  short  answer  to  the  question  posed  above  is  that  developed  countries
cannot have  it both ways.  Either they put their money where their mouth is,  and
include labor flows in the agenda of liberalization;  or they recognize the need  for
national  autonomy  and space,  in which case  they  must extend to the  developing
countries the same privileges in the areas of trade and capital flows.  [Rodrik 2001,
3]
But if cosmopolitan  liberalism is not applied across the board, then what is the second-best
policy?  Today we are much more attuned to the subtleties in second-best  arguments.  We are
aware that we cannot simply assume that liberal policies applied to everything but labor are
automatically second-best to 100% liberal policies.
Don Patinkin's "Nationalist" Model
Professor Patinkin of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, took the point of view of a middle-income
developing country much concerned with possible brain drain, a concern that is "implicitly a
rejection of the viewpoint that the 'world' should be considered as a single aggregate  from the
welfare viewpoint-and that the welfare of this unit is maximized by the free flow of resources
between countries."  [Patinkin  1968, 93]  Patinkin pointedly noted that developed countries do
not adopt this viewpoint about the "free flow of resources"  when the resources  are the
"population masses of (say) Far Eastern  Asia" and similarly underdeveloped  countries also do
not take this viewpoint when the resources are their own skilled members of the population.  In
short, developed and underdeveloped countries both take into account the "distribution effects"
among nations.  Neither group of countries really adopts the "free flow"  view across the board.
While thus taking a "nationalist" viewpoint without apology, Patinkin nevertheless  starts with the
liberal assumption of "free emigration"  and asks what developing countries can do to limit the
brain drain.  One approach would be to ask the more advanced countries to limit inmmigration of
highly skilled people.  But he rejects this as being impractical,  if not quixotic, since the firms and
scientific institutions of the developed world would persistently lobby for such immigration and
the governments would tend to support it.  Rather than ask the developed  countries not to
compete for this talent, Patinkin puts the emphasis on "what the underdeveloped  countries can
themselves  do to diminish the 'brain drain."' [Patinkin  1968, 95]  This has three interrelated
aspects:
1.  the countries must encourage  their trained scientific personnel to identify with the
development of the country,
'Perhaps  the phrase "Not In My Front Door" (NIMFD) will reach the legendary  status of "Not In My Back Yard"
(NIMBY).  While the "Front Door" may be officially closed  in some countries, the "Back Door" is another matter as
one can see from the slack enforcement  of laws about the employment of illegal immnigrants.
52.  the countries must show that these people can indeed fulfill a vital role in that
development,  and
3.  the countries must provide at least minimally for them to fulfill their scientific
aspirations.
Patinkin then goes on to suggest some concrete guidelines.  When training abroad is necessary,
then two years is probably a minimum period to get acclimatized  and four years is a maximum
period, after which there would be much attrition or readjustment problems upon return.  The
study should be at the graduate level, certainly post-BA and preferably post-MA.  If there is an
adequate PhD program at home, then specialized training should be post-doctoral.  Greater
advantages would flow from sending more mature, already employed, and preferably married
people abroad.  There might well be a follow-on function such as training others in what one had
learned abroad.  With these guidelines, the learner who goes abroad would have a "higher degree
of identification  with his home society and home institution."  [Patinkin  1968, 97]
In Patinkin's opinion, if the percentage of students lost abroad was more than 10-15%, then there
would be cause for alarm.  But, he adds, if there was no brain drain at all, then the country would
be underutilizing the opportunities for training abroad.  And as to fellowships from the
developed countries  for students to come there, Patinkin notes that it would be better to fund
instructors and professors to come to the developing countries  so that more students could be
reached.  In a similar manner, U.S. firms might establish "subsidiary research-and-development
plants abroad" to employ developing country scientists in their home countries and probably at
much less expense that in the United States.
One of the themes that flows throughout the migration literature is Albert Hirschman's exit-voice
dynamics  [1970].  One common form of reasoning is the "safety valve" idea of migration.  If
jobs are not available  in the home country, then some static efficiency  is achieved, and some
pressure is released,  through the safety valve of migration or gastarbeiter  arrangements.  But then
this may be dynamically inefficient by taking the pressure off of making the domestic reforms
necessary for business development that would create jobs at home.  But it will also not do
simply to lock the exit door, particularly when the government is accustomed  to turning a deaf
ear to voice.  Hence Patinkin makes the positive point that the brain drain exit opportunities
show the government  that the scientific community has other options and should not be taken for
granted.  The possibility and exercise of some exit is a type of voice that alerts the government to
improve conditions at home for the domestic scientific  community.
Finally Patinkin added an appendix  to the published paper to reflect some of the discussion at the
original conference where the papers were presented.  The appendix reflects Patinkin's
annoyance  at Johnson's argument that the free  flow of resources increases "world welfare" and
that opposition to that free flow reflected illiberal nationalistic anachronism.  Patinkin noted that
welfare economics  had not been able to produce a "world social welfare function."  Moreover,
the "free flow of resources"  reflects the effective demand created by very nationalistic forces in
the developed  countries.  He mentions the "U.S. government defense and space programs"  and
the American "nationalistic  war in Vietnam"  [Patinkin  1968,  106] and wonders how that would
be reflected in a "world social welfare  function."
6One positive argument given in Patinkin's appendix is an argument for the sort of intellectual
diversity that would result from having at least one good university in each developing country
with a "developed educational  and cultural life."  He notes that the dynamics of agglomeration
are at work in the formation or deformation of intellectual centers.  There needs to be a "critical
mass" of good people.  Even within a developed  country, "brain raids" of one university on
another can lead to a process of decline that is hard to reverse.  The same dynamics are even
stronger between developed and developing countries.  As soon as a scientist establishes some
prominence  in a developing country, hard-to-resist offers come in from the developed countries
so that it is very difficult to maintain  a top-flight university even in a mid-level developing
country.  The people who may just be a few more small jewels in the crown at a Harvard or a
Cambridge  may make all the difference in the "critical mass"  in their home country.
Commentary on the Patinkin's Argument
The critical mass argument used by Patinkin is ubiquitous in the brain drain and broader
development literature so it may be worthwhile  to present a simple statement of the idea for later
reference.
2
One type of critical mass dynamic is driven by expectations.  Suppose each scientist in some
home country reference group will make their plans to stay or leave depending on their
expectation about how many others will stay or leave.  These expectations are summarized in a
"reaction function."  Given the information to all scientists in the group that X% are staying, then
a Y% percentage  will consider that sufficient for them to stay.  Given X%, that Y% percentage
who will stay is given by the reaction function.
If given that 40% were staying, only 35% considered that sufficient for them to stay, then 40%
would not be an "equilibrium"  (where expectations matched reality).  The numbers would spiral
downward to some low level equilibrium.  If given that 75%  would stay, then at least 80%
considered that sufficient to stay themselves, then the dynamics would work the other way.  The
number staying would spiral upwards to a high level equilibrium.  In between, there would be a
"critical mass" number that would separate the downward and upward dynamics.  At each point,
the dynamics is indicated by comparing the reaction function to the upward-sloping  450 line as in
Figure  1 below.
2 See Schelling 1978 for an extensive treatment.  Our reaction function model is a reinterpretation of his faculty
meeting model in Chapter 3.  This dynamics  of divergence  can operate between two populations or within one
population to divide it into upper and lower strata.  For instance, a virtuous circle of city growth might have a
positive "spread effect" in a suburban  neighborhood but a negative "backwash effect" in a nearby rural area.  It is
sometimes  called the "Matthew Principle" after the Biblical reference:  "For to every one who has will more be
given,  and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away." [Matthew
25:29]  Gunnar Myrdal [1957] did the most to popularize these dynamics in the economic  development literature
particularly  to account for persistent  and increasing national and international inequality.
7Y% who  will  B
stay as a  Virtuous Circle"
function  of
supposition  C  I
that X% stay  "Critical Mass"
"Vicious Circle" or "Ghetto"
X% Staying in Home Country
Figure  1: Critical mass dynamics
Above the critical mass C, "the-more, the-merrier" dynamics of agglomeration  set in to drive
towards the high-level  equilibrium at B.  Below the critical mass, the dynamics of
disagglomeration work to "ghettoize" the scientific community in the country until the low level
equilibrium is reached at A.  Starting at B, if a few key people are "cherry-picked"  or "poached"
by the developed countries, then that may push the system down below the critical mass at C
which would trigger the self-reinforcing downward spiral to A.
It should be particularly noted that the downward dynamics below the critical mass is not a self-
equilibrating process between the sending (home) and receiving (host) countries.  The more that
leave the home country, the greater the push to leave and the greater the pull of the receiving
developed countries.  It 'snowballs' rather than equalizes.
There is no necessity that expectational  dynamics  work in this manner to drive toward an upper
and lower equilibrium with a critical mass in between.  Instead a "room for more" dynamic could
dominate the low levels and a dynamic of over-crowding and congestion could dominate at the
higher levels so that there was a single stable equilibrium in between  at C (see Figure 2).
Y% who will
stay as a
function of  Congestion
supposition
that X% stay  C
Eq~~uilibrium
"Room  for more"
X% Staying
Figure 2: Equalizing dynamics
8Mundane examples arise when people plan to go to a restaurant or to a nightclub.  Many people
would go to a restaurant that has "room for more" without being crowded but would avoid a
crowded one.  That would lead to the single equilibrium dynamics of Figure 2.  However for a
nightclub, they might want to be "where the action is" and that would lead to the critical mass
dynamics of Figure 1.
Many discussions in the migration literature are based on rather uninspired neoclassical models
that picture migration induced by wage differentials as equalizing the differentials between the
countries or regions of origin and destination.  But this is tantamount to just assuming that the
equalizing dynamics are in operation (e.g., diminishing returns to labor within a static production
function in each country)-when the question of the dynamics may be precisely the point at
issue.  In terms of the restaurant/nightclub  example, when a group of people leave the waiting
line at restaurant A to go to less-crowded  restaurant B, that may help to equalize conditions
between the two establishments.  But when a group of people depart from one nightclub to go to
another, that may induce even more migrations  in the same direction.3
Clarity in migration policy research starts with understanding these two different dynamics.  Are
the migration flows part of a critical mass dynamics driving one region to a low equilibrium
away from a high equilibrium-and perhaps doing the reverse for another region?  Or are the
flows part of an equilibrating dynamics reducing the push and pull factors between two countries
or regions?
North-North Migration
We have already seen how the critical mass dynamics could arise in the context of migration.
The equilibrating  dynamics also occurs and is often the assumed mental  model in policy
discussions.  If we consider the historical North-North migrations from a crowded Europe to a
sparsely populated North America  [e.g., Hatton and Williamson  1998; O'Rourke and Williamson
2000], then it might be represented by the equilibrating dynamics.  If we took X% to represent
Europe (or some part of it) in the  19th century, then the flow of the "tired and huddled masses"
from those "teeming shores" to North America would relieve the crowding or congestion in the
sending region and thus reduce the "push" factor.  The "empty spaces" of North America would
become less empty which would reduce the "pull" factor so the migration would equilibrate the
pressures on both ends.
In North-North migration, the sending country or region is relatively developed so the question
of the migration being detrimental to the sending region tends not to arise.  The migration
equilibrates  pressures (like water flowing between two containers) and does not start a
disequilibrating downward spiral to a low-level "trap" equilibrium.  If all migration was of this
type then it would be much less of a developmental issue.
3 The dynamics between two groups  will be treated in a "reaction square" diagram in Appendix 2.
9Congestion
"Room for more"
% Staying in Sending Region
Figure 3:  "Normal" Migration
South-South Migration
We will use "South-South"  migration to refer to flows between  or within relatively
underdeveloped regions or countries (even if the migration is geographically in the North).  For
instance, an "excess"  population was artificially subsidized in the arctic north of the former
Soviet Union.  The Russian government no longer has reason to subsidize the arctic cities so (in
a World Bank supported project) out-migration is being initiated and encouraged.
A reduction in subsidies and aid given to those who stay will tend to unambiguously shift the
reaction function downward.  At each given percentage, less will be willing to stay than before
the subsidy reduction.  Thus with either dynamics, there will be dynamics pushing for a lower
equilibrium.
New
___________________  ~~  ~~~A'
% Staying in Sending Region  % Staying in Sending Region
Figure 4: A Downward Shift in the Reaction Curve in the Two Cases
In the case of the "normal" equilibrating  dynamics, a downward shift in the reaction curve would
lead to a continuous transition to a lower equilibrium (e.g.,  from C to C' in Figure 4).  However,
in the case of the critical mass dynamics, a sufficient downward shift in the reaction  function
could eliminate the high equilibrium and critical mass so that everything would gravitate to a
new low equilibrium.
10At the other extreme of temperatures,  desert regions of Africa in the Sahel often  seem to be
unable to support their current populations without a continuing infusion of aid and relief.  A
better use of the aid may be to initiate and encourage the out-migration  of most of the population
from the unviable region.  Such a downward shift in the reaction curve would, under either
dynamic, lead to a lower equilibrium.
Rural-urban migration and interior-coast  migration might also be seen as south-south migration.
From a policy viewpoint,  the two cases, equilibrating  or critical mass dynamics, are somewhat
different.  If the sending region was seen as viable but simply as having too many people for
what the region could support, then some out-migration  might be encouraged in the equilibrating
dynamics scenario.  But if the region was essentially unviable and yet most people were staying
there due to some weak agglomeration effects sustained perhaps by subsidies and aid, then the
underlying policy model is a downward shift in the reaction curve in the critical mass dynamics
model.  If the arctic north or Sahel are seen as being unviable, then action might be based on the
critical mass dynamics model.  This will have a detrimental effort on any expectations of
development  in those regions, but that effect is deliberate.  However, policies to promote out-
migration from rural or interior regions to the cities or coastal area might be based on the
equilibrating dynamics.
This is related to the policy question of "people or places"  [e.g., Ravallion and Wodon  1997].
Ultimately it would seem that the policy commitment is always to people, not places per se.  But
policy questions might come unavoidably packaged  as "place" questions as long as governments
are geographically defined.  For instance, we noted how a deliberate out-migration  policy might
take all or most of the population out of an unviable region.  But suppose that "place" was not
just a desolate region but a whole country?  Then the out-migration would entail people moving
to another country and essentially depopulating the given country.
In the period of decolonization in Africa following WWII, many rather haphazardly drawn
colonial borders hardened into state boundaries.  Where previously people had been able to
migrate and settle in a better place, now they were tagged with citizenship in a state and
migration might carry them across  a state boundary.  Since they were not "from" the receiving
country, citizenship might not be readily available.  Even if not treated as refugees, then as
"aliens"  they would be less likely to make the sort of economic investment that would make the
migration a positive developmental  force  [see Chapter 8: The Politics of Migration and
Citizenship in Herbst 2000].
It might be useful in this regard to carry out the thought-experiment of supposing that all the
states in the United States during the 18th and  19th centuries had been separate countries.  All the
migratory flows across the continent would have been from one country to another with the
migrants perhaps denied citizenship  and treated as aliens in the receiving states.  It seems clear
that such disunited states would have greatly retarded the economic development of the North
American continent.  A multilateral  development agency, which was part of the given system of
states, would be ill-positioned to address this basic developmental problem.  The agency could
encourage the free movement of goods and capital between the disunited states, but the free flow
of people (with quick and secure citizenship granted in the receiving states) would be quite
11another matter.  This thought-experiment  about the "disunited states" is a device to gain some
perspective on the policy questions of south-south migration in Africa today.
North-South Migration in General
The labels  "north-north" and "south-south" were used to label migrations between  regions that
were either both relatively developed or both relatively underdeveloped.  Either the out-
migration was not detrimental to development in the sending region (e.g.,  in the north-north
case) or the negative effect was a conscious by-product of the attempt to de-populate  unviable
areas (e.g., desert or arctic regions) or to concentrate people where there were  agglomeration
effects (e.g.,  in urban areas or coastal regions).
North-south migration is migration to a relatively developed region or country ("north") from a
relatively undeveloped one ("south")-where the development of the sending region is still a
policy goal.  The economic differential  between the sending and receiving ends is the main
determinant of north-south migration.  It should not be assumed that push factors such as lack of
local jobs are predominant; it is the differential  that counts.4 From the policy viewpoint, the
label "north-south" will be applied to migrations where there is a presumption that the
development of the "south" is still a policy goal (e.g., of the national government or international
development agencies).  There is no presumption that any detrimental effect on the sending
region is an intended goal  or an acceptable  by-product of other policy goals.
North-south migration causes many of the migration-related  problems in the world today both in
the sending and receiving areas-although our focus is on the developmental impact in the
sending areas.  Powerful economic  forces drive the north-south migration.  The communication
and transportation revolutions that are part of globalization have quickened  the pace and
expanded the flows.  It is the interaction and perhaps collision of these globalizing  forces with
the policy goal of the development of the sending area that has generated much commentary and
speculation about the long run effects.
e  Is the out-migration part of an equalizing dynamic that will improve conditions  (e.g., relieve
"over-population")  in the sending region?
*  Is the out-migration  a temporary negative factor that might, however, be more than
compensated for by the backflow of remittances  and skills that will together with other
developmental  forces drive the area from a low to high equilibrium and thus eventually
reduce the out-migration?
*  Or does the out-migration  largely feed and sustain a low-level equilibrium notwithstanding
the backflow of remittances and returnees?
*  Perhaps a "happy face" should be put on the whole question by seeing the "production and
export" of unskilled and skilled labor as a comparative  advantage of the sending  area which
might be "promoted" as an export industry?
4A manager of a tire factory in Ecuador reports  "We don't have a labour market here any more....  They finish their
education and they go"  He now requires neither prior experience nor a high school diploma,  and he has had to
double the salary offered to new workers.  [Economist 2002a, 42]
12These are some of the basic policy questions and perspectives  that run through the current policy
literature on north-south migration.
Unskilled North-South Migration
"Temporary" Labor Migration as a Permanent Way of Life
Gastarbeiters or guestworkers  from Turkey  and the Balkans to post-WWII Germany were
originally seen as potential drivers of development for the sending regions.  The workers could
learn industrial skills and new technologies that could then drive development  in their home
countries.  They would see societies with more economic development and with different laws,
institutions, and habits of the people.5 Remittances and the savings of returnees would provide
the capital for a developmental "lift-off" in the less developed regions.
None of this was impossible.  Yet the gastarbeiter phenomenon  has not, on the whole, driven
development in the sending regions.  It may be useful to explore some of the reasons.
Historically, temporary work elsewhere might well be a way to acquire a capital stake.  During
the "Gold Rush" in mid-l9t  century America, people from across the country "rushed" to the
West Coast to try to make some quick money.  Some made money directly  from the gold and
silver, and many others made money from the high prices for provisions.  But diminishing
returns soon set in as the rich veins of gold and silver dwindled.  Then many of the miners  and
provisioners returned home with their capital stake-all  to the benefit of the sending regions.
One of the key elements was the time limit on the Gold Rush.  It was not available  as a
permanent way of life.
Temporary work abroad can also be a means of technology transfer.  When the Axis powers
occupied Yugoslavia during WWII,  a sizable number of technically trained workers and
engineers-particularly  from the more Germanized part of the country, Slovenia-were taken to
Germany to work in the advanced industries.  When the "forced migrants"  returned after the
War, Slovenia made a concerted effort to use that new knowledge to build a group of electrical
and electronics companies,  the Iskra (Spark) group.  That laid the foundation for the modern
high technology industry in Slovenia, and it may account, in no small part, for Slovenia being the
leading transition economy today.  Here again, the labor migration was by nature temporary.
A similar story can be told for some internal rural  to urban migration and return.  During the
Chinese Civil War, some peasants moved to the industrial cities such as Shanghai to escape the
chaos in the countryside.  After the Revolution, they returned home with enough industrial skills
to begin some off-farm rural industrial workshops that laid the foundations for the success of the
township-village  enterprises  (TVEs) many years later.
Thus it is not impossible for temporary labor migration to provide the capital stake and
technological  knowledge to drive development in the sending region.  But is that an accurate
5 "It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of placing human
beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves,  and with modes of thought and action unlike those with
which they are familiar....  Such communication  has always been,  and is peculiarly in the present  age, one of the
primary sources of progress." [John  Stuart Mill  1899, Vol. I,  99-100; Book III, Chapter 17, para. 5].
13description  of the gastarbeiter and other temporary labor migrations between the less and more
developed  parts of the world today?  So far, it would seem the answer is negative.  The uses of
remittances will be considered in more detail below, so other aspects will be considered first.
The very name "gastarbeiter"  connotes a temporary guest.  In German industry after WWII, as in
the oil-rich countries of the Middle East or in the American south-west today, there was little
intention that the visiting workers would become permanent residents or citizens.  Yet as a
number of people have quipped, "there is nothing more permanent than 'temporary'  migration."
Some family members will go abroad to work, not as a temporary measure to acquire capital or
knowledge, but as a career choice that will increase and diversify the income of the whole
family.
Some researchers have entertained and promoted the idea of gastarbeiters returning home during
the economically active part of their lives (i.e., before retirement)  and then using their capital and
knowledge for economic development.  However, this proposed development strategy may
conflict with the migrant worker psychology [e.g., Bovenkerk  1974;  1982].  Being a gastarbeiter
is often their chosen career so coming home to work (before retirement)  is to be a failure in their
chosen career.  It would mean "not being good enough to keep their job or find another job in
Germany."  It is hard to build a development strategy on people doing what they, their families,
and their peers perceive  as being a failure!  Many of the speculations about the potential
developmental  role in the South of remittances and returnees  fail to take into account the social
and self-perceptions of the gastarbeiters  and other "temporary"  labor migrants about their
careers.
It is compatible with the self-perceptions of gastarbeiters  to successfully complete  their
"careers," to return home, and to ease into semi-retirement by starting a small life-style business
such as a shop, cafe, or small boarding-house.  But that is far from being an engine of
development.
Any rethinking should start with the idea that "temporary" should mean limited to a fixed total
time period of several years.  Migrants from Asia to the Gulf States are called "temporary"
because each episode is limited in time and they may not immigrate.  But this "temporary
migration'" is nevertheless a permanent way of life.  There is no sum-of-episodes  time limit of a
fixed number of years.  Hence it is not "temporary"  in the sense of being "time-limited."  That
would entail some form of a fixed time limitation (like "term limits" for politicians)  so that the
temporary job cannot become a "career."  Such a time limit would change the expectations.  Like
a student who receives some education  abroad and then returns home for a career at home, a
worker would see the time-limited migration as the chance to receive an on-the-job education
abroad and build up a capital stake to then return  home to make a career.
Best and Brightest Migration as Perpetuating the North-South Development  Divide
We have noted that "temporary unskilled labor migration" is usually not temporary.  It is
important to note that "unskilled" may apply to the sort of jobs the migrants have in the host
country, but it is not necessarily  a good description  of the migrants in their home country.  The
poorest of the poor are not the typical migrants.  Usually migrants have some considerable
entrepreneurial  drive towards self-betterment (of which the labor migration is testimony), some
14complement of skills, and some resources in order to finance the trip or trips.  Remittances may
lead to more migration because they show that mnigration works, they finance other family
members'  trips, and they show what the neighbors have to do to "keep up with the Jones."
This highlights another way in which labor migration can be detrimental to development.  Many
of "the best and the brightest" of the blue-collar workers-as well as the college-educated "brain
workers"  to be considered later-leave their home region so that their real talents and
capabilities are not brought to bear on overcoming the barriers to development at home.  The
question of the developmental impact of remittances will be considered below; our point here is
the withdrawal of the "human capital"  from the home region-not the return of financial, capital.
This is a variation on the old theme about how a meritocracy works to perpetuate  a stratified
society.7 For the sake of illustrative  simplicity, we could consider a society divided into two
classes, strata, or castes,  say, an upper class and a lower class.8 The "smart" way to organize
such a stratified society is as a meritocracy where the best and brightest from the lower strata can
be recruited without prejudice into the upper strata.9 Moreover, that should be the very
definition of "success" for someone born into the lower strata-that they should capitalize  on the
opportunities  offered by the meritocratic structure to achieve  individual success in the sense of
ascent "out of the ghetto"  and into the higher strata or class.  Such individual cases of worthy
ascent into the upper strata should be celebrated  far and wide as examples to which any
ambitious young person of low and unfortunate birth might aspire.  And with every success
story, those in the upper class might pat themselves  on the back for sponsoring a society that
allows such social mobility that is based on merit and is blind to the accidents of birth.
In this manner, the talents devoted to maintaining the stratification  and the privileges of the
upper portion of society are constantly renewed by the meritocratic recruitment  from below.  For
example the mandarin-dominated structure of ancient China was both rather static and long-
lived, in part, because it operated on such a meritocratic basis.
The problem is that such a dynamics may well be at work in the south-to-north migration of
"unskilled" as well as skilled migration in today's globalized world.  The "development  divide"
may be perpetuated by the "successes"  of the best and the brightest from the South making their
careers in the North.  This is a broad brush argument;  there are individual Moses-like exceptions,
such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King, who return to help organize structural change-but the
typical case is unfortunately rather different.
Migration as a Safety Valve  to Relieve  Pressing Social  Problems
In the last section, we reviewed the argument that migration provides "the best and brightest"
with an exit option and thus that their talents were considerably less available,  if not unavailable,
Using a production function such as Y = AKaLb,  there are two effects:  1)  the reduction in L, and 2) the retardation
in the processes to increase the residual coefficient A.  The second effect is the more important one from the
developmental viewpoint.
7The classic satire about such is society is Michael Young's The Rise of the Meritocracy  [1962].
8  The stratification can also be spatialized with the lower strata identified with a "ghetto."
9 There might also be some social mobility the other way as in various quips about "rags to riches and back to rags
in three generations."
15to any domestic developmental efforts.  The flip side of increased exit is that there is decreased
voice, or, in more general terms, decreased pressure to break through the barriers to structural
change.  Hirschman's  original example  [1970]  about exit-voice dynamics started with the
conventional wisdom that increased competition to the Nigerian railroads from trucking would
bring pressure on the railroads to reform.  However,  it had the opposite effect since the "best and
brightest" of the client base, i.e., the discriminating customers  who needed to get their goods to a
given place at a certain time, exited the railroad system and switched their business to trucking.
However, since the railroads could not be just shut down, the state continued to subsidize them
so, in all, there was even less pressure to break through the barriers required for difficult reforms
in the railroad system.'0
There are many ways that the pressure of problems that demand social change can be relieved
without being resolved.  One is to discover oil or gas deposits in one's backyard and then to
soften the rough edge of pressing problems with the natural resource rents.  Another way is to
misuse external aid or loans to "buy time" and postpone real changes-to pay the costs of not
changing rather than paying the costs of change [see Stem 2001].
Migration often seems to work in a similar way as a safety valve to relieve the pressure of a
pressing problem rather than to resolve it.  When yesterday's elites use their power to lock in
their position and thus to stifle innovation which can always be threatening, then the economy
will stagnate  and young people will not be able to find jobs that will utilize their skills and
engage their ambitions.  Migration provides the ambitious and skilled with individual exits.  It
helps to "export" the unemployment problem.  Overall,  it relieves the pressure to change the
structural barriers to improving the business climate.  It would be ill-advised to think that a
whole society can go "bankrupt" like an individual company that stagnates.  Unfortunately
history is abundant with quite long-lived stagnant societies where the elites have found ways to
constantly suppress or bleed off the pressure for change.
We will consider the important topic of remittances  next, but in the context of the safety valve
argument, remittances  amplify the deleterious effect of migration by relieving the pressure of,
pressing problems.  Many governments  in developing countries have now discovered the "oil
well" of remittances  which will help them to paper over problems and pay the costs of not
changing.
All this does not deny the fact (which Hirschman  also noted)  that exit can be itself a form of
voice independent of any bankruptcy mechanism.  National pride cannot be long sustained if
young people seek to obtain college degrees largely as exit visas.  This is why the deleterious
effects of migration (exit of best and brightest,  and relieving of pressures for change) operate
with greatest force in a country, region, or area with the collective self-image of a ghetto.  The
out-migration is a key part of the self-perpetuating ghettoization mechanism (i.e.,  the self-
10  Hirschman notes other examples where exit undercuts voice. For instance, Latin American  powerholders have
long encouraged the voluntary exile for political opponents  where they would not cause as much trouble [Hirschman
1970, 61].  This takes the pressure off of internal reforms.  Another interesting example is the tendency of Indian
industrial companies  to get their own electrical generators where the public supply is so unreliable.  This takes the
pressure off the public suppliers to reform the old system so the situation is self-reinforcing.
Both examples are discussed in chapter 7 of the World Development Report for 2003 [World Bank, 2003].
16reinforcing low equilibrium in the critical mass dynamics).  A "ghetto"  will never find collective
success  as long as the internalized definition of "success"  is individual exit.
Remittances: Streamlining Transmission and Increasing Developmental  Impact
Remittances from north-south labor migration have received great attention in the migration
literature [See Athukorala  1993; Massey et al.  1998; Woodruff and Zenteno 2001; Rapoport and
Docquier 2002].  There is much concern about the developmental  impact of aid transfers from
the North to the South, and yet, on the whole, remittances are even larger that all aid transfers.
Thus the potential  developmental role of remittances should be an important topic for policy
research and experimentation.
For example, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American  Development Bank
(IADB) has extensively studied remittances.  During 2002, there were $32 billion in remittances
sent to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, an increase of 17.6%  over the previous
year.  The United States accounted for 78% of the total.  In 2002, the amount far exceeded the
Official Development Assistance  (ODI) received by the region and were only slightly less than
foreign direct investment.  The IADB has held a number of conferences  and conducted many
studies on remittances with the following policy targets.
These  trends  have  led  to  a  general  consensus  focused  on  the  following  three
objectives:  (i)  To reduce the costs of transferring remittances;  (ii) To continuously
improve  the  ease  and  accessibility  of  remittance  transmission;  and,  (iii)  To
mobilize  and channel  savings  via the  increased  involvement  of formal  financial
institutions in the process.1 2
In a comprehensive survey, Lowell and de la,  Garza  [2000] covered the range of issues
concerning the developmental use of remittances.  The volume of remittances is growing rapidly
so that the market for remittance transfers is attracting  more for-profit and non-profit
competition.  Costs now seem to be falling as a result of these market forces so the expenditure
of scarce government attention and resources may not be necessary to reduce transmission costs.
Perhaps public policy attention should focus on increasing  the developmental impact of
remittances.  There is an old stylized fact that most remittances are spent on consumption,  health
care, education, land, and the like, but that there is little expenditure or investment in direct
productive  uses.  Many authors have argued that even if remittances  are spent non-productively,
there is still a pro-development multiplier effect particularly if the expenditures are used locally
instead of on imports.  There are two problems in this multiplier argument, at least if it is used to
argue that further policy initiatives are unnecessary.
The first problem in the multiplier argument is that the multiplier is a double-edged  sword.  As is
evident in a recession, reductions in expenditure  have a downward multiplier effect.  Thus any
volatility in remittances will be amplified through the multiplier effect in the home economy.
Businesses depending not just for their start but for their continuation on remittances will create
a vested interest in the economy for continued migration and remittances as a way of life.
12  See: http:/Hwww.iadb.or/r/mif/website/static/en/remitl.asp  and for updates, see www.iadb.or/1mif.
17The second problem in the multiplier argument is a more subtle distinction between expenditures
that are essentially sterile for development  and expenditures  that bring forth development that is
soon independent  of reliance on remittances.13 Jane Jacobs has forcefully developed this
distinction [Jacobs  1969;  1984]  which will be treated separately in an appendix (so as not to
digress here).  [For a discussion of migration,  see box on: Jane Jacobs on Regions Workers
Abandon]
Box 1. Jane Jacobs on Regions Workers Abandon
Jacobs [1984] considers the problems  of rural  settlements or regions that workers abandon to migrate to jobs in
cities.  After World War II, workers from Turkey,  Yugoslavia,  and a number of other countries in southern
Europe and North Africa were welcomed into northern Europe and particularly  in West Germany.  The
remittances sent back were  sizable, in some countries the single largest source of foreign exchange.  Yet when
unemployment  rose abruptly in northern Europe (e.g.,  1974 and 1980), hundreds of thousands of guest workers
lost their jobs and returned  to "the same unemployment  and underemployment  they had left."  [Jacobs  1984, 74]
The remittances,  in the mean time, had not put their home regions on the road to development.
Remittances,  while  they  last,  do alleviate  poverty  in  abandoned  regions,  just as  any  forms  of
transfer payments  from  rich  to poor regions alleviate  poverty  while  they  last.  The money  buys
imports for people and institutions  which they would otherwise have to go without, but that is all it
does. [Jacobs  1984, 75]
Jacobs tells the story of a small Mexican  village, Napizaro, that for forty years has been dependent on
remittances largely from migrant workers in the Los Angeles area.
Today  Napizaro  is as prosperous  a settlement as  can be  found in its entire  region.  The village's
twelve  hundred people live, for the most part, in comfortable  brick houses  with pretty patios and
TV antennas.  The community  has  street lights,  a modern  infirmary,  a community  center,  and a
new  bull  ring  named The  North  Hollywood  in  honor  of the  industrial  section  of Los  Angeles,
some fifteen hundred miles away, from which this prosperity comes.  [Jacobs  1984, 75]
The road between Napizaro  and North Hollywood is now well-trodden;  it has become a way of life.  When boys
get to working age, they are trained by retired returnees about what to expect in the American factories,  and
other villagers working in Los Angeles help to find them jobs.  Over the years, it seems that many of men have
considered starting their own company at home since they had acquired most of the skills necessary.  But they
have abandoned the idea as it seemed that their village was too isolated.
The skills and experience  the men have acquired in Los Angeles are usable only in the context of a
city economy with its symbiotic nests of suppliers and its markets, not in this economically barren
region.  One and the same lack-a vigorous  city right in the region-forces  the men to find work
far away and also makes it impossible  for them to start an industrial  plant of their own,  at home.
[Jacobs  1984,  76]
There are two points here that need to be teased  apart.  The need  for ties to vigorous cities are still key to rural
13 Many argue that the education of the young financed  by remittances is a merit good (an end in itself).  But that is
quite different than arguing that remittances  are used for education so that the next generation does not have to
migrate-indeed,  there is considerable evidence  to the contrary.  Where migration has become a "way of life,"
education  is seen as the road to a better migratory outcome  (perhaps with permanence) rather than local
development without migration.
18industrial development.  However,  there has been a communications and logistics revolution in the last twenty
years since Jacobs' assessment so today there may be better chances for various subcontracting  maquila
operations funded by migrants  as has been promoted by a state-sponsored program in Guanajuato, Mexico  [See
box on: The Mi Comunidad  Program in the Mexican state of Guanajuato].
In Mexico,  the  spread of maquilas to the  whole country  following  NAFTA has created  booms in
rural  employment in regions like the Gulf with extensive  direct benefits for the rural poor.  These
maquilas  are  in turn  sources  of local  linkages  for  services  and  the production  of regional  non-
tradables, adding indirect benefits to the direct employment effects.  Communities and regions can
have  highly pro-active  roles in attracting  these inVestments  and  maximizing local  linkage effects.
[de Janvry and Sadoulet 2001, 6]
The multiplier effects are not enough.  Other means need to be found to increase the
development impact of remittances.  Lowell  and de la Garza [2000] consider four ways of
"leveraging remittances."
1. "Capturing a Share of the Flow of Remittances":  Governments might try to intercept part of
remittances through duties or levies, or for investment in a national  development fund, but, aside
from some success  in Korea, this idea seems to have little support as the effect would be to drive
remittances into costly informal channels.  Otherwise there might be a voluntary check-off for
charitable purposes, but that does not promise much developmental impact.
2. "Financial Instruments  on Remittances":  One strategy  is to attract more remittances into
formal banking deposits which can give migrant families better interest rates as well as improve
the domestic banking sector and the national balance of payments.  Another strategy is for
financial institutions to offer remittance bonds which the families can cash in when they need the
money.  Or banks might offer foreign currency accounts to reduce the foreign exchange risk
borne by the migrant families.  However,  in the case of the remittance bonds or foreign exchange
accounts, the assets might well be invested by the banks in foreign assets which would seem to
defeat the developmental  goal of "capturing the remittances"  in the formal banking institutions.
And even when the banks invest the remitted funds domestically,  there is little likelihood that the
investments or loans will be in poor communities or have a direct (non-trickle-down)  effect on
the development of the communities  sending the migrants.'4
3. "Channeling Individual  Migrant Labor Earnings":  The idea is create incentives for more
direct productive investments of remittances.  Under this heading might be included micro-
finance schemes or credit unions particularly when the latter can make business loans [see ILO
2000].  Remittances put into micro-finance associations or credit unions could be expected to
have more of a local pro-poor development impact.  To encourage migrants to return and start
businesses, governments might offer tax breaks on imported equipment, training programs on
skills needed (beyond those acquired by the work abroad), and small enterprise  loans.
14 "Studies in  many countries have shown how the banking  system, if not regulated  to act differently, tends to
become an instrument  for siphoning off the savings from the poorer regions to the richer and more progressive ones
where returns on capital are high and secure."  [Myrdal  1957, 28]
194.  "Migrant-Sending Government Outreach to Migrant Collectives":  In Latin America,  the
associations or collectives of migrants from a town or even a small region are called "hometown
associations"  (HTAs).  While the HTA may have a political and social role in the host country,
they are increasingly serving as a channel for the collective investment of remittances in the
home state or town  [e.g., Smith 2001; Susan Martin 2001].  Ordinarily the funds are expended  in
various community projects which may help build social capital but may or may not have a local
developmental impact (e.g., retirement  homes, community halls, sports fields,  and even rodeo
and bull rings).
Box 2. Migrants'  Associations
Associations  or  clubs  of Latin  American  migrants  in  the  United  States  had  a  remarkable  development
during the nineties due to three main factors:  a) the strong increase of migration  flows  caused by the economic
bonanza;  b)  the  hardening  of  United  States  migratory  laws,  which encouraged  migrants  to  become  better
organized for the defense of their civil and labor rights; and c) the effort of several Latin American  governments
to initiate  a constructive  dialogue  with  their migrants  and  give  them a better  support  through  their consular
procedures.
At  present,  there  are  in  the  United  States  a  large  number  of migrants'  associations  from  El  Salvador,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Mexico and the Dominican  Republic.  They amount to thousands  and cover a large part
of the  country,  although  the  larger  number  are  located  in  Los  Angeles,  Chicago,  Dallas,  Miami,  Atlanta,
Houston, New York, Washington D.C., San Francisco and Seattle.
Migrants'  associations perform  a series of cultural and social activities  on behalf of their  members.  They
also  have  supported  all  sorts  of trades  with  their  home  countries  or communities  and  have  sponsored  their
cultural, religious  or civic festivities.  An important number of clubs have  gone further in order to support their
hometowns  with  donations  and  investments  for  community projects  and  local  development.  In  El  Salvador,
Guatemala  and Mexico,  the positive  impact of the  activities of this kind of associations  is already  visible  and
widely acknowledged.
Either for festivities, scholarships or community projects  or as  support in emergency  situations (as  with the
Hurricane  Mitch),  migrants  associations  regularly  send  donations  to their  home countries.  These flows  have
been called  collective or community remittances.
The amount  of these  donations  has not  been documented  in  a systematic  way and it is difficult  to make
aggregate  estimates on the subject. A middle  size Salvadorian  group,  from the Los Angeles  area, reported that
during  1997  they  managed  to  collect  10  thousand  dollars.  That  amount  was  donated  to  several  charity  or
cultural  institutions  in  the  hometown.  A  smaller  Salvadorian  association,  in  Washington  D.C.,  reported
donations of 37 thousand dollars in 6 years (CEPAL 2000, p. 57). These figures are similar to those found in the
case of Zacatecas,  Mexico,  where  the  clubs regularly  send annual  donations in the  range of 5 thousand  to  25
thousand  dollars, depending on the size of the club, its degree of development  and the project to be sponsored.
In Mexico, clubs have  begun to get organized also to exchange information on possible investment projects
in their hometowns,  to pool  resources from their members and  to channel  them to such projects.  [World Bank
2002,  14]
In the Mexican state of Zacatecas, the federal and state governments  will each match every dollar
donated to local projects by HTAs (a two-for-one match which sometimes becomes three-for-one
or "3 x  1" with a municipal match).  These projects (e.g., in 1995, $600,000 in 56 projects in 34
towns) are usually investments  in local public goods or small-scale infrastructure:  water
treatment, schools, roads, recreational  facilities, parks, and the like.
20Through this program, more than 400 projects have been completed in eight years
in Zacatecas.  The total investment made by migrants on those project amounts to
around 4.5  million dollars.  Of that total, 2.7  million dollars were invested  in the
last two years.  [World Bank 2002, iii]
In the Mexican  state of Guanajuato, the government has special office to help its migrants form
HTAs (Casas  de Guanajuato)  and it has also helped create a number of small garment factories
(maquiladoras)  when $60,000 or more is first put up by the local community  [see box on: The
Mi Comunidad  Program in the Mexican state of Guanajuato].
Box 3. The Mi Comunidad Program  in the Mexican state of Guanajuato
Guanajuato's program "Mi Comunidad" aims at attracting migrants'  savings to a business (a maquiladora)
that has also a targeted social impact in the home community. The members  of a particular HTA,  along with
local investors, are stockholders in that enterprise and have a business motivation, but at the same time they
keep a social concern  for their hometown  development. This combination is one of the most interesting  features
of the program....
Maquiladoras  in Guanajuato's  program were originally planned as joint public-private ventures,  with the
migrants or local investors contributing half of the capital (from 60 to 100 thousand dollars) and the state
government the other half. In the end the state government participated only as a facilitator,  developing the
business plan, putting up two months of wages and training courses for the new workers and making low-cost
loans available.  Other government officials offered legal, administrative  and technical advice,  when necessary.
The program started in  1996 with a promotion  for the establishment of ten maquiladoras  in seven
municipalities and it was well received and accepted by mnigrants from Guanajuato and their clubs (Casas de
Guanajuato).  Up to June 2000,  12 maquiladoras  had been completed and put into operation and nine more were
under way. The capital contributed  by the migrants is estimated at around 2.2 million dollars for the 21  firms.
The  12 firms in operation  employed around 500 people. The Casas participating in the program have been
mainly from Illinois and California.  [World Bank 2002,  19]
Lowell and de la Garza conclude their study with a number of useful cautionary notes.  Even
where families and HTAs are focused on the development of poor communities,  the financial
institutions who may hold the deposited funds might have quite different goals.  The families of
the migrants may also other desires and needs (consumption  and health care) that do not
necessarily bode well for local development.  In light of the downward multiplier effect, it is not
clear that remittances will always be stable or increasing.  Remittances are largely driven by
recent immigration.  As migrants spend more time in the host country and adjust, remittances
fall.  "As yesterday's new arrivals adjust, and as today's number of new arrivals falls, the
combined effect may be that remittances have peaked." [Lowell and de la Garza 2000, 24]
Box 4. Family Remittances, Migrants' Capital  and Local Development
Yuriria and Jerez are  two Mexican  municipalities  which  have  traditionally  been  labor exporters  to the
United  States.  Yuriria,  in  the  state  of Guanajuato,  is  a municipality  of 74 thousand  inhabitants,  of a rural
nature,  with  little employment  opportunities  and mostly  dedicated  to agriculture  and cattle  activities.  Only
2123%  of its active population has a job and two thirds of those who have it make less than 8 dollars a day.
Jerez, in Zacatecas,  has a smaller population  but of a more urban character.  The municipal  capital,  with
over 27,500  inhabitants,  concentrates  69%  of the population  of the  municipality  and  is  an  agricultural  and
commercial  center  of  regional  importance.  In  Jerez,  29%  of the  active  population  has  an  economic
occupation  but, as in Yuriria,  they make less than 8 dollars a day.  Urban activities offer more jobs in relative
terms, but equally underpaid.
In  those  circumstances,  it  is  not  strange  that  the  majority  of young  adults  in  both  municipalities,
specially  men, migrate  to the United  States in search of  a better life. In that country,  with a little luck,  they
soon come  to earn in one hour more than  they could get at their hometowns  in a whole  day of work. In  the
nineties,  the  out-migration  of  native  workers  from  both  municipalities  increased  rapidly  and  led  to  an
absolute  decrease of the population  during the decade.  In Yuriria the population  decreased  at an annual  rate
of  0.5%  and in Jerez at a 0.6%.
As  the  local  population  diminished,  the  flows  of family  remittances  started  to  increase  rapidly.  At
present, each municipality has an annual revenue of at least 25 million dollars from that source. This amounts
to  a per  capita income  from  remittances  of 339 dollars for  Yuriria and  457 dollars  for Jerez,  considerable
figures  if one  takes  into account  that  the per  capita GDP in  Guanajuato  is 4,100  dollars and  in Zacatecas
3,300 dollars.
Apart  from  family  remittances,  other  dollar  revenues  started  to  flow  during  the  nineties  into  this
municipalities.  Such flows come from the clubs that migrants have established  in several cities of the United
States,  mainly  in  California,  to  help  their  hometowns.  Since  long  ago,  the  migrants'  clubs  have  sent
donations  to their  home towns  to finance  civic  and  religious  festivities  or community projects.  But in  the
nineties they started to do it more regularly and in a greater scale, when specific programs were set up by the
state governments  to attract  such donations  and channel  them to specific  projects.  In  1993,  Zacatecas took
the  first  step  with  the  program  "3  x  1".  In  1996,  the  government  of Guanajuato  launched  an  alternative
program,  oriented  to  attract  savings  from  Guanajuato's  migrants  to  finance  the  establishment  of textile
maquiladoras in localities of high out-migration.
The  response  of Jerez  and  Yuriria's  migrants  to  these initiatives  was  very enthusiastic.  Natives  from
Jerez  have at least 5  active clubs  in California.  Since  1993  these clubs  have contributed  around  more  than
300  thousand  dollars  in  donations  or  collective  remittances  which  have  helped  to  promote  community
projects for over  I million dollars in their native  hometowns.  The grants  have been growing  every  year. In
the last two years they sent over 160 thousand dollars for the paving of streets and the construction  of public
buildings and schools.
In  California,  migrants  from  Yuriria joined  the  Casas  Guanajuato  in  response  to  the  government  of
Guanajuato's  program  and  pooled  resources  to  set up  3  textile  maquiladoras  in their  native  municipality,
totally  financed with  migrants'  capital. For that purpose,  they  invested a total of 220 thousand dollars.  The
state  government  provided  them  with  the  project's  technical  design  and,  above  all,  helped  them  to  get
organized.  Two of these enterprises have 20 partners  or more. The maquiladoras  were in operation when this
study was done and had generated over  100 permanent jobs.
Apart from  their financial contribution,  migrants  have supported  the projects  with their managerial  and
entrepreneurial  skills, especially  in the  case of maquiladoras,  which  had  serious problems  in their original
design that the migrants had to overcome.
Migrants'  capital  in  Yuriria  and  collective  remittances  in  Jerez  are  two  early  manifestations  of the
enormous  economic  potential  that  the  Mexican  community  is  developing  in  the  United  States.  Both
constitute resources of great importance  for local economies.  Mobilized at a larger scale and with innovative
schemes, such resources offer the possibility of contributing to the development of vast rural  zones that are in
a difficult phase of transition towards modernity. [World Bank 2002, 6]
22Commentary on the Remittances Literature
Increased  Income is Not Increased  Development
Overall, the remittance  literature seems too sanguine about the expenditure of remittances.
Much of the expenditure  is sterile for developmental purposes, e.g., non-local expenditures  on
conspicuous consumption.'5 At a recent World Bank conference, Manolo Abella,  the head of the
MLO's Migration Program, voiced some of the skepticism.
There  is  general  agreement  among  observers  that  by itself  labour  migration  is
unlikely to significantly improve  the development potential  of a sending country.
While individual  migrants and their families tend to gain from migration (in terms
of greater economic  security), the  same cannot be claimed  for the countries,  as  a
whole.  There  is  little  evidence  to  indicate  that  labour  migration  and  flows  of
remittances  have generated sustained growth....
Take a look at the variation  in recent development  performance  of major labour-
sending  countries-Mexico,  Turkey,  the  Philippines,  Pakistan,  Yemen,  Egypt,
Morocco,  Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Jamaica, etc.  Which countries have managed to
sustain high rates of economic growth?  [Abella 2002]
In a community now largely dependent on income from migrant remittances,  development would
mean building local enterprises that would not live off remittances directly or indirectly (via the
multiplier) so that local jobs could be sustained without continuing migration and remittances.
While the initial investment funds or even initial sales might come from remittances  (a pump-
priming effect), the idea is that the products should be largely exported from the community to
satisfy demand unrelated to the community's remittances  (see the appendix on Jane Jacobs).
Remittances could jump-start the local engines of development but should not supply the on-
going fuel.
Changing the Psychology of Labor Migration
Today there is increasing policy interest in the developmental  impact of labor migration  on the
home region.  Yet much of the policy discussion takes as a "given" that the labor migration is
essentially  a way of life for the local communities.  Instead of seeing the temporary "export of
labor"  as a means to get a capital stake or as a learning experience, the export of labor, no matter
how it is nominally called "temporary," is the way of life of the communities.
Box 5. Ahmeti's Village
A detailed case study [ESI 2002] of an ethnic Albanian  village (Zajas)  in Macedonia  provides an example of a
community  where living off of remnittances  has become  a way of life.  The local Albanian economy runs almost
entirely on remittances.
15  Some researchers  have even noted that conspicuous consumption  by some migrant families may spur other
families to send out migrants:  "migration may represent an effort to 'keep up with the neighbors'-if migrant
families have better homes and TVs, then non-migrant families may be motivated  to send a migrant abroad to earn
money to overcome  their  relative deprivation"  [Martin and Straubhaar 2001, 3; see also Stark 1991].
23There  are  184  shops  crammed  into  the  Albanian  end of Aleksandar  Makedonski  Street,  selling
carpets,  furniture, jewellery and  wedding  gowns.  The  shops make  most of their annual  turnover
during  the summer months,  when  thousands of Albanian  migrants  return  to get married or build
houses in their  villages.  In  this period,  the  Albanian  quarter bustles  with activity,  and  Cadillacs
and  other impressive  cars with Chicago  and Alaska license  plates are parked along the sidewalks.
Many of Kicevo's  300 private taxi drivers make a living shuttling the diaspora to and from Skopje
airport.  The  heart  of the  Albanian  economy  is  made  up  of traders,  restaurateurs,  construction
workers,  money changers, tradesmen and a few lawyers and private doctors.  [ESI 2002, 8]
The social expenditures of the Albanian diaspora tend to be unrelated to local development,  e.g., a hall for social
functions such as weddings  and even a new soccer stadium.  The researchers illustrated the social structure and
expectations by taking the entering  1989 class in a high school in the neighboring mixed town of Kicevo and then
looking at what they were doing a decade later.  Of the ethnic Albanians, all except one were working abroad and
the one's father was  working in Germany.  Of the ethnic Macedonians,  all continued  to live in the immediate
region.  This illustrates the self-reinforcing critical mass dynamics of the labor migration for the ethnic Albanians
and the lack of migration for the ethnic Macedonians.
Emigration tends to be a cumulative process.  Its incidence is a positive function of the number of
earlier emigrants  who provide money,  information and  support for newcomers.  If Kicevo's  ethnic
Macedonians  have  relatives  abroad,  they  usually  emigrated  for Australia  in  the  1950s  and  no
longer  maintain  close  links  with  family  who  remained.  There  is  no  equivalent  of the  dense
networks  which  Albanian  have constructed  between  Kicevo and  the  outside  world over  the past
two decades.  [ESI 2002, 25]
There was one interesting  exception to the rule of non-productive expenditure of the remittances  from the
Albanian diaspora [concerning  Albania  itself, see Martin et al. 2000 and Nicholson 2001,  2002].  An ethnic
Albanian with a clothing company in France set up a cut-and-sew subcontracting  company in Kicevo with about
100 workers (ironically,  all but two of them are ethnic Macedonians  who worked for a former Yugoslav textile
company).  Cloth is trucked in from France and the finished product is sent back with the company in France
acting as the contractor.  While this is not an example of a migrant returning permanently  to run a business at
home, it is a case reminiscent  of the small garment factories  (maquiladoras)  in Guanajuato, Mexico where the
company is a labor-intensive part of a value chain based in the North.
I would argue that the local developmental  project is lost if this labor migration continues as a
way of life.  There are two related arguments here.  One argument is that the static-efficiency
option of increased earnings through semi-permanent  labor migration is dynamically inefficient
in the sense of foreclosing on the option of local development.  Martin and Straubhaar noted this
when commenting on studies such as Abadan-Unat  [1976]  about the Turkish experience  with
gastarbeiters.
These  studies  concluded  that  Turkish  areas  of origin  were  not  primed  for  an
economic  take  off before  emigration  began,  and  that remittances  and  returning
migrants  reinforced  trends  that prevented  a take-off rather  than  fueling  the take
off for reasons that included  ... :
*  nonproductive use of remittances,  e.g., to speculate on real estate or to imitate
a successful service such as a delivery service, taxi, or a shop
24*  the retirement of many migrants, so that skills acquired abroad are not used to
promote development
*  some  distortion  of local  incentives,  as  when  children  do  not  stay  in  school
because  the  wage  for  unskilled  work  abroad  is  several  times  the  wage  for
skilled work at home.
In sum, the conclusion of the leading study of the  1970s was that labor emigration
is  "cumulative  and  self-perpetuating"  (Abadan-Unat,  et  al.  1976,  p.  384)-
migrants leave  an  area because  it is less developed,  and remittances  and returris
reinforce  the  dependence  of the  areas  on an  external  labor  market.  [Martin  and
Straubhaar 2001,  18]
In depressed and under-developed  regions, if the pressures of local unemployment and poverty
are routinely released by labor migration, then the various barriers  to development  will probably
not be surmounted and the regions' lack of development will be perpetuated.
The second argument is that the psychology of labor migration as a way of life does not bode
well for local development.  As noted previously, returning  home to make one's living there
(before retirement) is seen as a failure to sustain one's "career" as a labor migrant.
In any case, developmental policies that take that psychology as a "given" would have little
chance of success.  In terms of the critical mass dynamics, the local area is at the low equilibrium
and the critical mass necessary to move to the high equilibrium will not materialize as long as the
expectations  are based on the possibility of semi-permanent  labor migration.  One strategy to
change that psychology would be temporary labor migration schemes that were really
temporary-that  had a "cap" or "term limit" on the time spent using the scheme.
We will meet this question of reversing the psychology of escape-valve  labor migration again in
the discussion of skilled labor migration or the brain drain.  As we saw in the "debate" between
Harry Johnson and Don Patinkin, this is one of the contentious  issues beneath the surface in
migration research.  Much of the policy focus in rnigration studies is to grease the wheels of
semi-permanent migration which in the case of the critical mass dynamics would only perpetuate
the low equilibrium trap in the home country or region.  In a few cases, this policy outcome is
intended as when the sending region is unviable (e.g., desert,  arctic, or disease-ridden  regions).
Otherwise, there seems to be a policy conflict  which might be addressed  with genuinely
temporary labor migration arrangements.
Temporary Worker Schemes
Here "temporary"  means a time-limited closed-ended arrangement that cannot go on indefinitely.
For instance, during and after World War II for two decades, the Bracero  program in the United
States allowed six month visas (but was stopped, in part, because of the slippage).  Today in
Europe,  temporary agricultural workers in the EU have 3 month limits per year and construction
workers are limited to the duration of the specific project [see Boeri and Briicker 2000].  The
idea of fixed-time temporary migration schemes is receiving increasing policy attention as it
addresses some policy goals in both the north and south  [e.g., Werner  1996; Gilbreath  2001;
Meyers 2002].
25One  potentially  Pareto-efficient  solution  is  to  institute  a  system  of  temporary
contract employment  in the host countries,  with various  penalties on the migrant
and/or his employer to ensure that there is repatriation  after a set number of years.
In  principle,  the  return  migrants  would  then  be  in  an  even  better  position  to
contribute to the development of their home economies.  [Rodrik 2001, 2]
Since the workers are entering the host country for a fixed time period (perhaps in a special visa
category),  there are no immigration implications,  and since the workers are not accompanied by
families, there are virtually no social implications.  There might be other arrangements, but the
goals of this sort of arrangement are solely earning to acquire a "nest-egg"  which can then be
used back in the home country perhaps to capitalize  a small business-as well as learning new
skills and new ways of doing business which can be applied in the home country.  In some cases,
the host company may decide to help guest-workers  to set up a subcontracting operation back in
their home country to produce a low-end product that the guest-workers learned to produce
during the temporary work at the company.  Thus the temporary labor arrangements might pave
the way for exports and FDI for the home country.
From the viewpoint of the home country, the regularization  of this sort of scheme would help to
reset psychological expectations  so that work abroad would be seen as a path to local
development rather than an escape from local under-development.  Regularization  itself would
also help to take business  away from the smugglers  and traffickers  who prosper with ever tighter
restrictions on labor migration.  The idea of a temporary labor scheme will be illustrated with an
example that grew rather spontaneously out of a World Bank project [see box on Moldova-
Slovenia Temporary Labor Scheme].
Box 6.  The Moldova-Slovenia Temporary Labor Scheme
In Moldova,  the poorest of the former Soviet republics,  a rather successful restructuring agency, ARIA, was set
up  with the help of a World Bank private sector development  loan [Ellerman  and Kreacic  2002].  Part of the
program was for managers and skilled blue-collar workers to spend some time working in enterprises  in more
advanced countries.  In these programs, it is important that the more advanced countries not be too advanced;
otherwise the experience  will have little applicability back in the home country.  In the case of Moldova, this
meant selecting a country not in the west, but in the "near-west"  of central Europe such as Hungary,  Poland, or
Slovenia.
In the case of Slovenia, ARIA had consulting services from a Slovene organization with restructuring
experience.  Out of that relationship, a temporary labor migration  scheme emerged that proved to be
commercially  viable on its own.  Groups of skilled blue-collar  workers would be selected  in Moldova according
to certain criteria.  They would be financed by their companies  to be placed for six months working in Slovene
companies  and living together in apartments.  The workers  would be paid at minimum Slovene rates  which
were over five times their usual wages.  At the end of the six months, they would have acquired not only
industrial and technical skills but also a nest-egg of savings.  Some workers would buy a cheap used car in
Slovenia and then drive back to Moldova.  Others would use their savings for investments  back in Moldova.
Another consequence  of the program was some subcontracting and investment of Slovene companies back into
Moldova.  Some workers came for several  six month periods.  Eventually  the Slovene hosts realized  that they
could subcontract some of the low-end items to be produced  back in Moldova by the workers they had
trained-perhaps  with some special machinery supplied from Slovenia.  Thus the "trade" in the form of
temporary fixed-term migration leads to trade in goods  and eventually to capital investment.  Worker
placements  were so successful  for both parties that a company  was formed in Slovenia to run the program
entirely on a private basis.
26Lant Pritchett has argued [2002] that temporary worker schemes offer perhaps the best way to
reap the development potential of migrant labor (e.g., remittances,  increased skills, trade and
business linkages,  and a broadened view of alternative ways of doing things) in a way that is
politically feasible in view of stiffening political resistance to unskilled immigration in many
countries in the North.
An  alternative  [to  the  current  system]  is  to  allow  permission  for  a  certain
number of workers in a certain industry and then allow hiring firms  to locate and
hire  workers  of their own choosing  but  give  workers  a conditional  entry permit
and  allow  individuals  and firms/employers  to find  their own matches.  This has
the benefit of not linking workers  to specific jobs but makes  enforcement  of the
numerical  quotas difficult.
Another is to allow "labor mobility brokers" to have licenses to supply a given
number of workers for specific occupations.  In this way the recruiting,  matching
to jobs  and  transport  are  the  responsibility  of  a  "firm"  not  individuals  and  the
matching is done in the sending country.  But the employment relationship  is with
a domestic  firm. In many cases this is how it is done currently in practice,  but the
fact  that it is  mostly illegal  means  that  workers  are  even  at  more  risk of being
exploited  and abused ....
A third approach  is to  follow  the model  of "services  trade"  and have  sending
country  firms  enter into  agreements to provide  certain  services,  with  the right to
bring in their own employees to do the work.  In this case the recruiting, matching
to  jobs  are  done  in  the  sending  country  and  the  employment  relationship  is
between  a sending country firm and the workers  and the host country firm enters
into  a  contracting  relationship  with  the  sending  country  firm  only  (and  has  no
"employment" relationship  with workers).
I think the intermediate  approach  of having  "labor  mobility brokers"  is  the
most attractive,  for several  reasons,  the primary of which is it makes it easier  to
control  flows  for  the  sending  countries  and to  protect worker  rights  in the  host
countries.  [Pritchett 2002,  13]
The example of the Moldova-Slovenia company  would also fit into the category of labor
mobility brokers.
Return Migration and Spin-offs  in Rural Towns
It was previously noted that when migration is essentially seen as a career,  then return migration
before retirement  may be seen as a sign of failure.  This may be why various host country
programs [e.g., low-interest loans to start a company back in the home country;  see Lowell and
de la Garza 2000; Weil 2001; Martin and Straubhaar  2001] sponsoring return migration have not
so far been a great success.  However there are some examples, not usually associated with the
migration literature, where return migration has played an important role in non-farm rural
development.  In contrast to the Guanajuato example where continuing migrants  were partly
funding enterprises in their home regions, the focus in this section is enterprises  set up by
27returning migrants which may be spin-offs or subcontractors  to the firms that employed the
workers as migrants.
One of the most remarkable growth episodes in recent history was due to the rise of the
township-village enterprises (TVEs) in China over the last twenty years.  It might be useful to
look briefly at their origins.  The TVEs did not drop from heaven as soon as conditions were
liberalized.  One source can be traced back to the immediate post-revolutionary period.  To
escape the fighting during the Civil War, a number of peasants had migrated to the industrial
cities, principally  Shanghai.  Years later, after the Revolution, they return-migrated to their
villages hoping to get land ownership.  But their years of industrial work in the cities left them
ill-suited to work the land-which was collectivized anyway-so many of these peasants started
small off-farm workshops to apply their industrial skills, particularly in the region around
Shanghai  (Jiangsu Province).
In the decades that followed, large-scale political movements swept over China:  the Great Leap
Forward, the Cultural Revolution,  and the Sino-Soviet Split.  All these movements had the effect
of pushing to decentralize  and deconcentrate  industry from the cities to the countryside.  The
initial  successes around Shanghai provided some models but, on the whole, the state-directed
efforts were not very successful.  Yet the failures in the collective-brigade enterprises  were
instructive.  When the agricultural reforms got underway in the late 70s, this provided the
demand and workers for an 'educated' rebirth of the commune-brigade  enterprises  as township-
village enterprises.  As the cellular structure of the economy left over from the Maoist
experiments broke down, the TVEs could further reap the benefits of trade and specialization.
This evolution of the TVEs was historically specific so policy lessons cannot be directly drawn.
But it is nevertheless  instructive and it corroborates  a fundamental point emphasized by Jane
Jacobs based on western experience.  Rural development starts in the cities; "city economies
create new kinds of work for the rural world, and by doing so also invent and reinvent new rural
economies."  [Jacobs  1969, 39]  Rural development schemes should focus on urban-rural linkages
which includes "imports" into rural areas of industrial skills and inputs for production  as well as
"exports" back to urban areas if the rural off-farm firms are to grow beyond micro-shops
servicing local needs.
Some of the north-south dynamics seen between the advanced and developing countries were
reproduced between urban and rural areas in China.  For a variety of reasons (e.g., scarce urban
housing space), urban factories would sub-contract labor-intensive jobs [as in the Mexican
maquilas] to rural areas instead of staffing up to have them done in-house.  This started vigorous
import-export trade between urban and rural areas  so that rural off-farm firms could grow
beyond small shops for local needs.
Moreover, just as Chinese factories might buy old machinery from developed countries, so rural
industries in China might get their start using old machinery from urban Chinese factories.  To
help shed urban labor and deconcentrate industry, some urban factory workers from a small
region not too far from an urban center, might be encouraged to take some of the older
machinery  and set up a TVE in their old village and then subcontract to their old factory.
28Throughout the developing world, people are leaving rural areas and migrating to mega-cities
and the north in search of jobs.  But the older industrial model of large urban factories engaged
in mass production is now being replaced with another model favoring more decentralization  and
rural development.
This new  system  of subcontracting  with a  large  number of small,  decentralized
workshops  (maquilas)  and  household  units  is  well  adapted  to  the  1990s'
environment of market uncertainties  and the tremendous  growth during  the  1980s
of the informal economy....
Wood products,  textiles and clothing,  and shoes and leather goods are commonly
produced under subcontract by such enterprises.  The shoe industries around Nova
Hamburgo  in Brazil  (Sabel  [1986])  and Le6n  in Mexico  (de  Janvry  and  others
1989)  are  organized  on  that  basis,  with  many  subcontracting  workshops  and
households located in the surrounding rural areas.
Support  to  these  enterprises  in  the  form  of  credit,  infrastructure,  simple
technology,  and the development  of skills  may be one of the most effective  way
of promoting  the revival of competitive industries and their location in rural areas.
[de Janvry and Sadoulet  1993, 269]
The Chinese experience with TVEs also suggests such a program to spur rural off-farm
development and help alleviate urban congestion at the same time.  Middle managers  and groups
of workers from a certain region could be encouraged to spin-off some of the older machinery
and set up a subcontracting operation in their home region or town.  The subcontracting work
would help get it going, but it could also diversify into other niches to spur local development.
At present, urban factories have  little incentive to encourage  such a program.  As long as workers
show up at their doors, urban factories do not bear the costs of urban congestion or rural decay.
Public action is required.  This would not only sponsor some return-migration  but would, of
greater importance, reduce the migration flows to the mega-cities as some rural industry took
root in the countryside.
Skilled North-South Migration: The Brain Drain
Globalization and the Brain Drain
In the immediate  post-WWVI  period, the brain drain was seen as a problem [e.g., the Johnson-
Patinkin debate and the other papers in Adams 1958]  like a "bad cold" that might hinder the
activities of developing countries.  Today, with the quickening of international processes that is
called "globalization,"  the brain drain has become more like a "pneumonia"  (or "SARS")
crippling the activities of some countries, e.g., in sub-Sahara Africa and particularly  in South
Africa.  Some polic'  ideas suggested in the past period of focus on the brain drain, such as legal
restrictions on exit  or a "departure tax" paid by receiving countries to sending countries, are
16  Until  1824, England had restrictions on the out-migration  of skilled artisans  but it was not for fear of brain drain
from England  but for fear of brain gain to competing countries on the Continent.  But the effect then  (as now) was
less to prevent out-migration as to discourage return-migration:  "Restriction on emigration of artisans  failed to
prevent their departure,  but did inhibit their return."  [Kindleberger  1978, 47]  A similar perverse  side-effect has been
noted for strengthened  restrictions on unskilled in-migration as noted by Wayne Cornelius: "The current strategy of
29now seen as archaic  and unimplementable.  Other ideas, such as a "transnational"  community of
scientists  and engineers helping both the receiving and sending countries, may be even more
feasible due to globalization.  Thus while globalization might aggravate some old problems, it
might also entrain some new solutions.
Skilled Labor as an "Export"
Previously we made the distinction between guest-worker migration  as a career and as a time-
limited means to obtain skills, knowledge,  and capital  to be applied at home.  From the
developmental viewpoint, it was not the migration itself that could be adjudged a help or
hindrance but the whole pattern of behavior involving the migration.
A similar distinction can be carried over to skilled migration and the brain drain.  When a young
doctor goes abroad for some work, is that to acquire first-hand knowledge of medical  practices in
industrialized countries (like an internship) to improve practices at home and perhaps to obtain
enough capital to open up an independent practice at home?  Or is the purpose to make a rather
permanent exit by finding long-term employment in the North?  The evidence  seems clear that
the bulk of the cases fit the second profile.
One policy response is to "make the best of it" by treating the training of skilled people  as
essentially an export industry where the "payments" will come back as remittances.  The training
of medical personnel in the Philippines, the Caribbean, and a number of other countries  would
seem to fit this model.  This training might take place at privately financed institutions where
public policy would have little purchase.  If the training was at public expense, then it would
seem, at least at first, that this was a clear waste of public expenditure.  There is a multiple loss,
the human capital, the public monies that funded the training, and the later fiscal loss.
To the loss of productive potential,  add the fiscal loss from migration.  Taxpayers
in developing  countries  have paid to educate  many of those who leave  (and who
may well end up working in jobs below the level their qualifications  would justify
at home).  And emigration leaves behind fewer workers to pay the cost of looking
after  the old. ... A  recent  study  of the  fiscal effects  of the Indian  brain  drain, by
Mihir Desai of Harvard  University and two colleagues  [Desai et al. 2001],  points
out that the  lm Indians in the United States  accounted for a mere 0.1%  of India's
population  but  earned  the  equivalent  of  a  staggering  10%  of  India's  national
income.  [Economist 2002b, 25]
Any remittances in return for this "exported  human capital"  would go privately to the families of
the skilled migrants which would hardly justify public expenditure.
One argument is that the costs of higher public education should be treated as a loan (secured in
some fashion) unless the graduates  satisfy certain minimal requirements of public service after
graduation.  This policy would seem to be fair but it may be difficult to implement.  Travel
abroad would have a broadening effect,  and further study abroad might greatly enhance the value
border enforcement is keeping more unauthorised migrants in the US  that it is keeping out."  [quoted in Economist
2002c, 6]
30of the graduate's education.  "Hard" requirements  to enforce  the education loans, such as exit
bonds'  or liens against family assets, might have the effect of crowdin:g out the graduate's
intrinsic comrnitment to and identification  with the country and thus lead to perverse
consequences.  If one's obligation to one's home country was thus represented simply as the need
to pay off a bank loan, then, once "paid in full," the graduate would have little compunction in
seeking opportunities  elsewhere.  Public service obligations might have some of this crowding
out effect but probably much less so than a monetized obligation.
There is one counter-argument  against seeing public grant funding of education  for export as a
clear loss.  The argument is that if students see higher education, say in medicine or the sciences,
as a means to out-migrate, then so many more students might be attracted into these professions
that the country will have a net increase in supply even after subtracting off the successful
emigrants.  Due to the ease of immigrating to the US as a doctor, Jamaica loses four out of every
five doctors trained but, according to this argument, it at least gets one out of five!
It is surely true that where a professional degree is seen as an exit visa, then the demand for such
degrees will be increased.  After the financial collapse in Russia in  1998, there was an increase in
enrollments in science  and technology.  The initial delight of educators was somewhat tempered
when interviews showed that since the "getting rich" exit door was then closed, many students
saw a science and technology education as the best road out of Russia.  The net result of this
"natural  experiment" may well be that Russia will end up with more trained scientists and
engineers than would otherwise  have been the case.
While this mechanism might thus operate willy-nilly, the author finds the idea of promoting it as
a deliberate policy to be rather bizarre.  Even leaving aside the substantial  waste of national
educational resources, how could any country that takes pride in its scientific,  engineering, or
medical professions urge students to become educated in those professions as a means to exit the
country?  If that were officially promoted as the goal of science education in the country, then
the "National  Academy of Science" would soon be seen as a ghettoized "National Academy of
Second- and Third-Rate Science"-whose members  are those who were not good enough to get
job offers in the advanced industrialized countries.18 But, at least, this policy idea has the 'virtue'
that if accepted by the developing countries, then the developed countries could continue their
poaching of the best and brightest of the trained scientists and professionals with a clear
conscience. 19
17 In establishing the University of Naples in 1224, Frederick  II tried to entice students by arranging for creditors to
supply loans.  The students could not leave the city unless the loans were paid back or valuable "pawns"  were left
with the creditor.
18 This has a rough empirical check.  Even where not touted as a rationale for science education, one might surmise
that in countries such as India which have significant emigration of scientists, the scientists  who remain home for
whatever reason will still labor under the stigma of being seen as second-rate.  There are also some programs to top
up the salaries or extend other enticements to professionals  who return-which are duly resented by those
professionals  who never emigrated  or those who returned  without bribes.
19 In biological terms, the poaching would have advanced  from a form of 'parasitism' to a form of 'symbiosis.'
31Organizing the Diaspora
One meta-principle of development assistance is to look at what spontaneous or unassisted social
processes have helped development,  and then figure out how to catalyze those processes in other
countries or regions.  Look at where water flows naturally,  and where it is flowing in the right
direction, deepen the channel  so that a stream might swell to a river.20
The re-involvement  of the diaspora in the home country-not necessarily permanent return but
through investment and integration  in networks-is such a historical process that many countries
and agencies are now trying to catalyze.  This policy idea of organizing the diaspora is
complementary to efforts within the home country to increase retention of scientists, engineers,
and professionals; one can do both.  The point is not to treat dmigres as being irreparably lost to
the home country; they can play a very positive transnational  role.
More  likely  to  succeed  [than  a  retention  strategy]  is  a  Diaspora  model,  which
integrates  past  and  present  citizens  into  a  web  of rights  and obligations  in  the
extended  community  defined  with  the  home  country  as  the  center.  [Bhagwati
2003]
One major historical model of diaspora-assisted  development22 is the role of the 50 million
overseas Chinese in China [Weidenbaum and Hughes  1996].  The overseas Chinese have been
remarkably successful in business so they can bring considerable experience,  network
connections,  and capital  back to benefit investment in China.  Moreover, their common
language, culture, and family networks gave them guanxi or connections that non-Chinese
investors did not have.  The example  might be tempered by the argument [Naughton  1999] that
the bulk of the Chinese diaspora investment into China was by the Hong-Kong Chinese who, in
the face of Hong-Kong's reabsorption into China,  had special incentives to gain favor from the
Chinese authorities.
India governments  at the state and national level and various expatriate groups have now become
quite active to re-involve  the extensive Indian scientific and business diaspora back in India [see
Saxenian 2000 and Kapur 2001].  The Y2K problem in the late 1990s provided the sudden need
for much re-programming  in 'archaic' computer languages which provided, in turn, for many
outsourced 'body-shop' deals for Bangalore.  The experience  and trust built-up  from that episode
spilled over into substantive business deals during the dot.com boom at the virtual level
supplemented by the temporary migration of many Indian software engineers and programmers
to the West.  2 3 In addition to this trade in services,  the Indian high-tech diaspora in Silicon
20 And, recalling our earlier discussion of unskilled migration, where the water is flowing  in the 'wrong' direction,
then instead of trying to build  a dam, it is better to try to rechannel the water into acceptable  nearby channels.
21 "Transnational"  has become a popular term that connotes more globalization-enhanced  betweeness,  circularity,
back-and-forthness,  or toing-and-froing  than old-fashioned  terms like "international."  See Portes 1999.
22 The case of modern Israel could be mentioned but policy lessons are hard to draw because it is such a special case.
23 After the dot.com bust, the joke was that "B2B"  stood for "Back to Bangalore."
32Valley and other technology centers  in the U.S. has become much more organized to form a
transnational community that brings experience, connections,  capital, and deals to India.24
Similar initiatives are at work today from the side of governments and the side of expatriate
groups to form mutually beneficial transnational communities  centered around countries that
have sizable diasporas such as South Africa, Argentina, Armenia, Pakistan, and Israel in addition
to India and China.
In addition to these broader efforts to organize a country-diaspora relationship,  there are many
Internet-based  networks that specialize in the sciences and engineering.  These networks build
upon the older experience of the UNDP's Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
(TOKTEN) program.  The South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) has identified
some 40-odd networks  such as the Colombian Red Caldas network, the Global Korean Network,
the Philippines Brain Gain Network, the Polish Scientists Abroad, the Association of Thai
Professionals in North America and Canada, the Iranian Scientific Information Network, the
Tunisian Scientific Consortium,  and the Arab Scientists and Technologists  Abroad [see Brown
2000; Solimano 2002].
There is a menu of policy options associated  with catalyzing  the organization of skilled and
professional diasporas  starting with supporting use of the Internet by expatriates to build
organized groups and by agencies in the home countries to build relationships  with the centers of
expatriate activity.  The transnational  relationship might start with discussion and information
exchange.  The problem is usually to develop transactions and business deals all of which might
lead to the investment of diaspora expertise and capital in the development of the home country.
Expatriate groups  and ministries in the home country can collaborate  on investment fairs in
developed countries and tours of investors in the home country.  Business incubators  might have
a role in both countries-home-country  exporters needing a base in a developed country, e.g., the
International Business Incubator in San Jose (Silicon Valley),  or for fledgling businesses in the
home country sponsored or mentored by expatriates.
Educational Policies  to Reduce the Brain Drain
In the previous section, we discussed the strategy of organizing relationships with the diaspora
into more of a transnational community working to develop the home country.  That takes the
diaspora as a given.  That strategy is quite compatible with other policies to reform the public
higher education system (including programs for study abroad) so as to reduce the incidence of
the brain drain in the first place.
We might approach this policy question by considering the analogy with worker training in the
private sector.  If a company pays for upgrading a worker's skills (which are always to some
extent transferable),  then another company could offer a higher wage to try to poach the already
24 One part of the "transnational  diaspora community"  idea is to downplay the role of return migration to obtain
these outcomes.  Various programs  to facilitate permanent return migration for highly skilled professionals  have
become notorious for their meager  outcomes, and that seems unlikely to change in the countries  which need  help the
most.
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trained worker.  One strategy would be to "privatize" worker training by having each worker
pay for his or her own training.  This is analogous to a country privatizing its higher education
system so that no public resources would be expended on those who might exit.  In both the case
of a company and a country, this policy would tend to restrict the education to those who already
had the required resources or else loans would be generously provided, in which case we are
back to the collection problem for those who exit.
Another corporate strategy is to provide for worker education but at the same time try to build a
corporate culture that would increase worker identification  with the company and reduce exit.
"In particular,  identification becomes  an important means for removing or reducing those
inefficiencies that are labeled by the terms 'moral hazard' and 'opportunism."'  [Simon 1991,  41]
This is one of the keystones of human resource policies in Japanese or other "high-road" firms
using Japanese-style  policies  [e.g., Kagono and Kobayashi  1994].  Invest heavily in worker
training along with a culture of identification to reduce opportunistic exits.  Moreover,  as each
firm develops its own routines and procedures in a path-dependent manner, an increasing
proportion of worker training may be firm-specific  so that retention becomes self-reinforcing
over time.  The following table summarizes some of the contrasts between a firn  organized on
the "logic of exit" (high labor mobility between firms) or on the "logic of commitment"  (low
labor mobility between firms).
Table 1: Two Logics of Work Organization
Area of  Logic of Exit  Logic of Commitment
Comparison
Efficiency  Allocative efficiency:  Move given resource to  X-efficiency:  Get highest value out of
highest value use.  Efficiency (allocative)  resources in given use.  X-efficiency (effort)
enhanced by mobility.  enhanced by immobility (cannot easily jump
ship). [Leibenstein  1984]
Results of  Universal certification to maximize mobility  Knowledge  is local, embedded, partly tacit,
education  and thus efficiency of allocation.  and shown in practice,  not in certificates.
Identity  Mobility enhanced by identifying  with  Identifies with social group; village, company,
profession or other universal category.  institution, and motivated to better it.
Labor mobility  High mobility so changes take place primarily  Low mobility so changes take place primarily
by replacing old with new workers embodying  by commitment to workers learning  new
new knowledge.  knowledge.
Process  Deskill to standard repetitive tasks so that  PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) cycle of con-
improvement  workers  are replaceable.  Skills change  tinuous improvement.  Learning as scientific
exogenously.  Expertise is exogenous or  method in the small.  Expertise develops as
located in management  so staff can be more  embedded local and tacit knowledge of staff
deskilled and replaceable.  Staff thus do not  involved in continuous improvement.
identify with firm or institution.  Encourages  staff identification  with firm.
Payment system  Paid "going rate"  for certified skills.  Equal  Paid according  to seniority and skills shown in
pay for equal work.  Payment attached  to job.  firm-specific jobs. Payment attached to person
Individual-based payment by results.  (probably under going-rate at beginning and
over it at end-all an incentive to stay).
25 Peter Williams  [2000]  notes the analogy between  the brain drain problem and training inside of firms that may
result in the lost of already-trained  people.  This would lead to an underinvestment in non-firm-specific firm-
sponsored training since it is a positive externality.  It seems there are vocational  education subsidies in the UK to
try to overcome that underinvestment  problem.
34Area of  Logic of Exit  Logic  of Commitment
Comparison
Motivation  Workers expected  to be motivated by  Members expected  to identify with
individual material self-interest  organization & have  shared group interest.
Stability and  Low trust relationships  => highly explicit  High trust relationships => incomplete
trust in  contracts with competitive arm's length exit-  relational contracts  with voice-oriented
relationships.  oriented relationships  so no need to invest in  relationships requiring investment  in building
building trust or loyalty => low trust  trust and loyalty => high trust relationships.
relationships.  Individual pays for learning.  Company  pays for learning.
Entry in firm  Entry in all levels  (logic of exit at all levels)  Entry at lower levels and then development
from within (logic of commitment)
Style of  Standardized,  professionalized behavior as a  Familiarity, intimacy  in long-term
interpersonal  means of coordinating people.  Low  relationships  as means of coordinating  people.
relationships.  interpersonal knowledge  associated  with high  High interpersonal  knowledge  associated  with
turnover.  low turnover.
Application  to  Exit to find a better home.  Commit to making home better.
Migrationr
Our strategy is to see if these ideas of Japanese-style  human resource management  ("logic of
commitment") could be carried over by analogy into ways to reform higher public education  in a
developing country to reduce the incidence of the brain drain.  But first it might be useful to take
note of an earlier set of educational reforms proposed by Ronald Dore  [1976,  1997] (an
economic sociologist with a specialization, incidentally,  on the Japanese economy).
Although Dore was concerned with educational reform for its own sake, his suggestions would
have the indirect effect of helping to reduce the brain drain in developing countries  (and thus
there is a partial overlap with Patinkin's suggestions  considered before).  Dore's diploma disease
critique focused on the effects of the obsession with educational credentials  and with the
escalation of the credentials required for jobs.  In developing countries where there are more
graduates than jobs, the level of credentials is used as a filter for job applicants.  Hence students
strive to get even more credentials,  and those offering jobs need to escalate the requirements still
further.  The original purposes of education,  e.g., the learning needed to do a job, are crowded
out by the.focus on (crammable)  exams and diplomas, e.g., the credentials  needed to get a job.
The original content of the education systems are often aimed at foreign goals (e.g., yesterday's
standards from the colonial center or today's globalized standards) of little relevance to local
jobs, and even that content is sacrificed in the rat-race of the diploma disease.
Dore's proposals would require a coordinated  transformation in the tertiary educational  system
and in the organizations providing jobs.  Individuals should be taken into jobs at an earlier age
and learning (part-time in tertiary educational institutions as well as on the job) becomes a life-
26  I long process guided by the requirements  and opportunities of the work.  The company or work
organization would pay for the continuing tertiary education.  Filtering would be based on the
26 This is similar to the Japanese-style  firm with entry at a young age and continuing education  promoted by the
firm.  For instance,  with changing  technologies, the workers "require formal training at regular intervals in a quasi-
school environment that complements the informal training they receive on the job in order to systematize their
experiences on the job." [Aoki 1988, 52]
35demonstrated ability to continue to learn and to do the job, not on the acquisition of universal
certificates.27 Dore gives some detailed and slightly playful suggestions for more flavor.
The  civil service,  for instance,  would  no longer  recruit graduates.  There would,
instead, be a single  major entry port for all grades  at the age of 16 (or whatever
were  fixed as  the school leaving age)  and everyone  would start as  a clerk;  some,
on the  results  of internal  tests, or  on the  basis  of work  performance,  would  be
promoted fairly quickly to the executive grades  and given such further training  as
was  necessary,  and  some  of  those  would  similarly  be  selected-and
educated/trained-for  administrative posts.  The same pattern could apply to other
professions.  Future  engineers  could  train  first  as  craftsmen;  some  of  the
craftsmen  could be trained as technicians,  and the ablest of those sent off for full
training  as  engineers.  Doctors  could  begin  as  medical  assistants;  teachers  as
pupil-teachers;  university  teachers  as  research  assistants  or  secretaries  or
schoolteachers;  architects  and accountants  and quantity  surveyors could begin  as
clerks and be selected for professional training....  [Dore  1976,  143]
Co-op education programs (alternating terms studying and working in a company) are a step in
this direction.  When study abroad is appropriate, it would be financed by the company and
would probably take place at an older age when the individual  not only had a job waiting upon
return but had a family and other roots in the home country.
Although addressing the brain drain was not an explicit goal of Dore's program, it is clear the
suggestions  would also have that effect.  A national system of education/work designed along
these lines would maximize the retention of the best and brightest just as these Japanese-style
people development ("human resource management")  policies have that effect in the context of a
firm.  Thus Dore's suggestions stand in sharp contrast to the "globalization  of education"
described as follows:
The proportion of foreign students studying for professional degrees  or doctorates
in  the  university  systems of the  major industrialized  countries,  in  particular  the
United States,  is large and more than two-thirds  simply stay on.  The situation  is
similar  in  Europe  albeit  on  a  smaller  scale.  At  the  same  time,  centres  of
excellence  in  higher  education  in  labour-exporting  developing  countries  are
increasingly  adopting  curricula  that  conform  to  international  patterns  and
standards.  Given  the  facility  of language,  such  people  are  employable  almost
anywhere.  [Nayyar 2002, 164]
27 Similarly,  the Japanese-style firm "can  identify slow learning, low productivity,  low motivation, and
uncooperative  workers by actual observation and differentiate them in pay and status over the long run, while
attempting to lock in fast-learning,  highly productive, highly motivated,  cooperative workers by discouraging  them
from quitting in midcareer."  [Aoki 1988, 50]  Hence  this system emphasizes  the X-efficiency  of retaining and
developing  "the best and brightest"  as opposed to a system designed to equip people with universal credentials so
they would have the greatest mobility to seek the highest paid opportunities  on an allocatively efficient global labor
market.
36Thus without reforms such as those suggested by Dore, the "centres of excellence  in higher
education"  in the brain drain countries  seem almost designed to perpetuate their status as brain
exporters.
Summary of Conceptual Issues
The Dilemmas of Migration and Development
Throughout this survey, the focus has been on the home country developmental  impact of
migration and on the policies to improve that impact.  No attempt was made to be solely
descriptive;  arguments for and against certain policies were presented. 28 As one who has thought
about and worked on broader development issues for some time but is relatively new to
migration issues, my impression is that much of the literature is excessively optimistic about the
impact of north-south migration on the South.  Some of the literature  has the Pollyannaish (if not
Panglossian)  flavor of almost ignoring strong first-order effects that are negative in the
determined search for second- or third-order effects that might be positive.  Examples would
include the literature that sees remittance income as tantamount to "development"  or that
suggests promoting the brain drain as a positive inducement for young people to seek scientific
or professional education  in the South.
When due account is taken of the negative developmental impacts of north-south migration, then
it would seem that the field of "migration and development" is unsettled and unresolved for good
reason.  The dilemmas are surprisingly basic and fundamental.  Seemingly good arguments can
be made on both sides of major issues; intelligent people  (like Harry Johnson and Don Patinkin)
can differ on the issues.  And some of the issues are but the reflection in the sphere of migration
studies of larger issues that rend the field of development studies.  Perhaps it would be
appropriate in closing to summarize some of those basic issues.
The Dynamics  of Convergence  or Divergence?
One basic issue is the question of the underlying dynamic mechanisms.  Here the contrast is
between negative feedback self-limiting mechanisms (equalizing dynamics) and positive
feedback self-reinforcing mechanisms (critical mass dynamics).  Almost all neoclassical
economics is based on a diminishing returns assumption.  As factors move from a low return use
to a higher return use, the high return is diminished and the low return is increased which tends
to eliminate the discrepancy.  But the opposite case of positive feedback ("increasing  returns")  is
now receiving increasing attention  in the literature of economics  [Myrdal  1957 was an early
example] and the complexity sciences.  This leads to multiple equilibria perhaps of a "high" and
"low" variety (the "twin peaks" dynamics  of divergence).  This is the dynamics of the Matthew
Principle whereas the equalizing dynamics represents the opposite principle-"From those who
have, some will be taken away and given to those who have not."
It seems clear that the north-north migration from Europe to America during the  18th and  l9th
centuries was for the most part an equalizing dynamics  mechanism.29 But part of the controversy
today is about whether north-south migration is part of an equalizing dynamics of convergence
28  Unless expressly attributed to others, the views expressed are the author's  own.
29 An argument could be made that migration out of some regions such as Southern Italy and Sicily then and now
was not an equalizing  dynamic but contributed to the continuing poverty of those regions.
37or part of a critical mass dynamics of divergence.  Time and again, one finds unguarded and
unstated assumptions  in the literature that a factor movement from a low to high return will tend
to equalize the returns rather than aggravate the discrepancy-as if the flight of human and
financial capital out of a country could be expected to improve development prospects in the
country.
This argument  can also be stated in terms of Hirschmanian  inducement or pressure mechanisms
and his exit/voice dynamics.  Suppose there are two groups A and B.  If problems and
bottlenecks appear in group B, then the exit of some members  from B to A could have either a
positive or negative effect on B.  It might be that the exit or defection of some members of B
would alert the other members  or their leaders that changes needed to be made to resolve
problems and overcome bottlenecks.  That would lead to an equalizing dynamics between A and
B.  But it might work the other way.  The members exiting from B might be the most articulate
or capable members, so that their exit made it even less likely that vested interests could be
overcome to resolve the problems.  This would lead to the dynamics of divergence.
It could work either way.  When the entrenched elites in a developing countries  see the highly
educated young people emigrating, does that steel their resolve to make the changes necessary to
stanch the brain drain or does it just reduce the pressure on them to give up the privileges that are
barriers to development and that lead to the brain drain in the first place?  Is it exit or non-exit-
cum-voice that would create the most pressure and inducement for change?  This is not a
question that can be settled a priori. But it can be said that there should be no a priori
assumption that exit ("switch rather than fight") rather than non-exit ("fight rather than switch")
is best way to induce reforms, i.e.,  no assumption that exit will be equalize the difference rather
than aggravate the problem.
There are a number of social mechanisms that are designed to mitigate, if not defeat, the
dynamics of divergence of the Matthew Principle.  Anti-trust policy tries to break the "size
begets size" dynamics in the merger market so that companies will maintain some parity and
rivalry.  Separation of powers, term limits,30 and other constitutional limitations are designed to
mitigate the "power begets power" dynamics  in the political sphere.  And similarly in an
economy where only wealth begot wealth independently of effort and innovation, then the
breakdown of primogeniture  and the enactment of progressive income taxes and inheritance
taxes would help to mitigate that dynamics.  In professional sports, the practice of having the
worst teams get first choice in the draft of new players is aimed to defeat the dynamics of
divergence and maintain some competitive parity.
Universal public  schooling aims to disrupt the dynamics of educational divergence across
generations.  The proposals for school vouchers are often criticized as attempts to reintroduce  the
logic of exit and individual visions of success as getting one's kids into a better school-instead
of the other collective-action  logic of working to make the kids' school better.  Proponents  of
voucher plans routinely make the assumption that the underlying dynamics  are equalizing and
convergent rather than the opposite.  If the primary sources of pressure for betterment were the
30 For similar reasons,  term limits were suggested above for "temporary"  labor migration  schemes to defeat the self-
reinforcing rut-deepening habits of such schemes.
38articulate and concerned parents who would also be the first to exit under a voucher plan,  then
the underlying dynamics are those of divergence and ghettoization.31
The Logic  of Exit/Replacement  Versus the Logic  of Commitment/Transformation
Two logics cut across human affairs.  If the characteristics  of resources and structures (or uses)
are taken as fixed, then efficiency is seen through the logic of exit and replacement.  Resources
should exit or be replaced in a given use if there are feasible higher-valued allocations of
resources to uses.  That leads to allocative  efficiency.  If, however,  the location of the resources
in a use is taken as essentially fixed ("commitment") but the characteristics of the resources and
structures are taken as variable,  then efficiency is seen through the logic of commitment and
transformation.  How can the given resources and surrounding structures be transformed to reach
a higher value outcome?  That is the domain of what has been called "X-efficiency".  In some
formulations, the contrast between allocative and X efficiency might be rendered  as static (fixed
characteristics of resources  and uses but variable  allocation of resources to uses) versus dynamic
efficiency.  The two logics are elaborations  of Hirschman's treatment of exit versus voice [1970]
and the choice of taking characteristics  as fixed or variable is analyzed by Hirschman as "trait-
taking"  or "trait-making"  [1967].
Box 7. The Two Logics Elsewhere
It might be useful to see the problem of finding the best combinations of the two logics in other contexts.  When
optimizing in a multi-peaked  but cloudy landscape, there is the logic of commitment to climbing the hill you are
on (fight rather than  switch),  and there  is the logic of exit to try to jump to another  hill that might be  the true
peak (and not waste time climbing the wrong foothill, i.e.,  switch rather than fight).  In evolution  (including its
mathematical  versions  in genetic algorithms),  there is the process of selection  which,  as it were,  starts with the
commitment  to the  existing  set  of genetic  possibilities  and  then  exploiting  or refining  them to  determine  the
fittest, or there is the process of variation  (e.g.,  mutation and crossover or sexual  reproduction) which  works to
exit the given  hill on  the fitness landscape  and explore other possibilities.  In searching  a tree of possible paths,
the two logics become the choice of breadth-first versus depth-first search.  Is it best to commit to a branch and
exploit  it in depth  or should one emphasize  breadth by exploring many branches but with less depth?  Does a
detective  spend  more time  following up a given  clue or searching  for more clues?  Should  a manager  make  a
commitment to a given team and focus on developing  the capabilities  of the team,  or should  the manager take
those  characteristics  as  given  and focus  of shuffling  in and  out different  team  members  trying to get a better
combination?
Every potential  migrant faces  a similar situation:  to make a commitment  to staying home and trying to better it,
or to take its characteristics  as given and search elsewhere for a new and better home.  Commit to making home
better, or exit to find a better home.  Economic  models  of migrant behavior tend to model  only the  exit option
and  ignore  the  other possible  logic of  commitment  with  its inherent  uncertainties  about  the  possibilities  of
transformation.
31  For instance, New Zealand tried an thorough-going  voucher program, Tomorrow's Schools, in the early  1990s.
But the better schools soon filled with hand-picked students and turned away the hard to teach poor or minority
students who then had no alternative but return to their now more depleted old  schools.  Thus the dynamics of
divergence  left the schools even more stratified along socioeconomic  and ethnic lines.  [see "Vouchsafe?"  in Letters,
The Economist, May 31, 2003]
39The stylized models of the American firm versus the Japanese firm, e.g., Aoki's distinction
[1988] between the A-firm and the J-firm, are based on these two logics.  The manager in the A-
firm sees the organizational problem in terms of the market logic of exit and replacement.  How
to find the best resources  on the market, buying and selling or hiring and firing as necessary,  to
obtained the highest valued allocation of resources  in the firm?  Management in the J-firm sees
the organizational  problem in terms of a "community model" [Dore  1987] of commitment to an
essentially "given" set of people.  How can their skills and capabilities be developed and
transformed along with the surrounding organizational  structures to obtain the highest valued
outcome?
What the exit logic sees as inflexibility or rigidity (e.g.,  taking the allocation of people to an
organization  as a "given"), the other logic sees as comritment and loyalty.  Some organizational
mechanisms such as "barriers to exit"  [Kagono and Kobayashi  1994] are seen as irrational by one
logic but as quite rational by the other logic.  For instance, the organizational  norm of expecting
the "captain  to go down with the ship" or the "failed manager to fall on his sword" is designed to
close off the logic of exit and to promote the logic of commitment and transformation.  For
instance, since the Chinese TVEs faced a hard budget constraint (i.e., were like a ship that could
sink), the relative immobility of labor was seen by the logic of exit as "allocative inefficiency"
but was seen by the other logic as promoting the commitment, voice, and effort (i.e., X-
efficiency)  of the workers and managers to make sure that their TVE stayed afloat.
It is these two logics that cut across the analysis of migration and development.  If a worker in a
developing  country takes the characteristics of the "place" as fixed, then he or she will see
advancement through the logic of exit.  Commitment and voice are pointless if transformation  is
seen as impossible at least within the relevant future.  Hence they are looking for the best exit in
search of a higher valued use of their human resources.  This is the market-based logic
exemplified in the cosmopolitan liberalism of Harry Johnson.
However development policy-makers  in the developing country, e.g., Don Patinkin, take the
people as essentially given.  Starting with that commitment, they face the task of finding out how
the skills and capabilities of the people and the surrounding structures can be best transformed
and developed.  It is this common logic of commitment and transformation  that recommended
similar policies for Japanese-style  firms, Dore's educational reforms,  and development-oriented
policy-makers  in a developing country.
Individual Versus Collective  Visions  of Success
The prisoners' dilemma game is a well-known example where the individual strategy for success
is not the best collective strategy for success.  An individual vision of success comports well
with the logic of exit (defection) while a collective,  group, or community vision of success
evokes the logic of commitment.32 Consider a situation where there are essentially two
companies, countries, or groups A and B,  and that currently group A is "Number  1."  A person in
group B with an individual vision of success might well be using the logic of exit to find a way
32 See the related "ego-focused"  and "group-focused"  visions of change in Chapter 1 of Hirschman  1958 as well as
the analysis of individual versus collective action in Hirschman  1982.
40to migrate from B to A.  A person in group B with a collective vision of success might well be
using the logic of commitment to find a way to transform B  so that it became "Number 1" or at
least comparable with group A.
The dynamics of migration by the best and brightest from B to A might well be the dynamics of
divergence.  Group A might be able to sustain and increase its advantage  over B by poaching the
most capable people from B.  One subtle way for group A to promote that outcome would be to
promote the universal adoption of the objective meritocratic standard:  "success"  on the basis of
one's merits means individually joining the currently best group-not working to make your
group best.  As was forcefully shown in Michael Young's The Rise of the Meritocracy [1962],
such a meritocratic structure would tend to perpetuate the supremacy  of whatever is "group A."
Increased Income Versus Increased Development:  The 3 D's Deal
Debates about migration and development  also may surface basic differences about the goals of
development assistance.  Some see the goal of development  assistance as "putting resources  in
the hands of the poor"-a certain kind of "poverty reduction."  They see "increased  income" and
"increased living standards"  as being "development."  Others see increased income for the poor
as a worthy goal, but it is not itself "development."  Indeed,  depending on how it is done,
"poverty reduction"  (e.g., in the form of long-term charitable relief) may even be inimical to
development.  They see development  in a country or region as being based on developing and
diversifying the skills and capabilities of the people in the country so that they can earn the
"increased income"  as their value-added (as opposed to mere natural resource extraction)  in an
autonomous and sustainable way.
A question might help to frame the issue.  Suppose a poor and undeveloped country discovers a
large deposit of oil and gas so that the average income is substantially increased and living
standards are improved.  Is that by itself development?33
Now reframe the question where the "large deposit of oil and gas" is replaced by long-term
north-south unskilled migration with the ensuing flow of remittances back to the sending
country.  That, by itself, reduces poverty, increases incomes,  and improves  living standards so
why not take that, by itself, as one form of successful development?  Why should the jobs be in
the same physical region as the family homes in today's world of globalized transportation  and
communication?  We do not say that a suburban bedroom community is "underdeveloped"
because it contains no internal  sources of income since the jobs are in the nearby city.  Why
should our judgment be different when the bedroom community is hundreds  or thousands miles
away?
A "deal"-some would say a "devil's deal"-is being proposed between  the North  and South.  In
the developed North, many jobs, described by the three D's dirty, difficult, and dangerous,  are
not being filled by native workers.  For unskilled migrants,  these jobs would pay many times
over (e.g., 400%+) of what they could make in their home country in the South.  Hence there is a
deal to be struck.  The North will be the primary site of development  in the sense of jobs
33 The aggregate growth models of development economics  give remarkably little insight into these questions.  The
author finds some of the best and most accessible  thinking on this topic in the works of Jane Jacobs  [1969, 19841  so
her ideas are outlined in Appendix  1.
41including the low-end jobs that native workers don't want to fill.  The South will be a kind of
long-distance bedroom community furnishing workers  for these jobs.  This arrangement will
satisfy many of the conventional criteria for development in the South:  "increased income,"
"poverty reduction," and "improvements  in living standards."
There seems to be a subterranean fault line running under the field of "migration and
development" concerning this "3 D's deal" between North and South.  Usually the deal is not
stated in such bald terms-euphemisms,  blinkered vision, and Pollyanna scenarios abound.
Some supporters of the 3 D's deal emphasize the benefits to governments in the South; they can
export their unemployment  problems and import the hard currency to relieve their balance of
payments problems.  Some keep their eyes riveted on the improved living standards of the
individual temporary  migrants and their families,  and ignore the lock-in to a pattern of
economically sterile bedroom communities  in the South.  Some ignore decades of disappointed
hopes for gastarbeiter-remittance-led  development in order to embellish the lingering hope that
these patterns  "could" lead to real development in the South.  Others cut that Gordian knot and in
effect redefine "development"  in terms of "poverty reduction"  and "improvements in living
standards."
To this reviewer, the debate, implicit or explicit, over the 3 D's deal is fundamental  to policy
questions in the field of migration and development.
Complicating the Discourse on Migration and Globalization
Needless to say, globalization is a complex issue that needs to be approached from many sides.
Often globalization is praised as being unambiguously positive on the grounds of the market-
driven logic of exit, the equalizing dynamics of convergence, and individual visions of success.
The brunt of the conceptual framework used here is to complicate the discourse and to show that
the usual approach to globalization  is rather one-sided.  The logic of commitment  and
transformation  which embodies a group-focused  or collective-action vision of success has an
equal claim as a strategy for social improvement.  Moreover,  to the extent that the underlying
mechanism for the north-south interaction is the dynamics of divergence,  then the logic of exit to'
obtain individual success will work to perpetuate and aggravate the North-South Divide.
Summary of Policy  Research Issues
South-South Migration
Overall  the brunt of the message on migration and development is that "migration studies" is not
an isolated field with separate developmental solutions.  The development issues that arise with
migration are basic to the issues facing late-developing countries as a whole.
In the case of south-south migration, the principal issues arise when the economically  beneficial
migration cuts across post-colonial boundaries.  Such boundaries, when originally laid out, paid
little attention to the future economics of agglomeration  that might drive, say, interior-to-coast
migration across borders that nation-states  are trying to "harden."  Here policy research quickly
spills over into political questions of changing immigration and citizenship restrictions  and of
broader regional cooperation.
42Unskilled  North-South Migration
Current approaches to streamline the transmission of remittances  seem to have at best a neutral
impact on development issues.  If one of the fundamental  issues is the permanence of "temporary
labor migration"  (e.g., as part of the 3 D's deal) then facilitating remittances  does not address the
problem of reversing that migration-as-career psychology.
A related area of some controversy is the overall "view" of remittances.  The question is not
whether or not remittances are "good" but how they affect development.  Surely remittances
serve many positive social and individual functions such as reducing poverty.  But it has been
argued here that remittances by themselves  are economically barren unless they are used to spark
local businesses that become largely independent of getting still more remittances.  Thus it
would seem a mistake to narrow the focus of development assistance to economically sterile
"poverty reduction."
A more promising approach seems to be authorized but time-limited labor assignments  that
would help provide the capital and knowledge  for developmental  efforts at home.  These truly-
temporary labor migration schemes will also mesh well with the current increasing restrictions
on unskilled immigration in the North.  But limiting the "pull" circles us back to the "push"
problem that partly drives the migration,  the lack of development opportunities  at home.
Since the field of local economic development  is already well-plowed, I would only emphasize  a
topic that seems under-explored and yet central to capturing the developmental  possibilities of
temporary  migration.  This is the spin-off conundrum (see box in Appendix  1).
*  A low-end product now produced  in a congested urban factory might be spun off into a small
operation  in the surrounding rural or peri-urban area-and similarly between North and
South.
*  Instead of inhaling and exhaling migratory workers in a peripheral part of a company
according to fluctuations  in demand, the peripheral  operation might be spun off as a separate
operation near to the workers' home which could then diversify to stabilize its demand.
*  Old machinery to be replaced might be used to endow a spun-off shop in a rural region.
*  A technology,  once learned, can usually be used to produce an adjacent product that could be
the sharp focus of a spin-off rather than a blurring of focus in the original company.
In all these cases, the developmental  impact of the spin-off is a positive externality of the
original  operation and thus such spin-offs tend to be under-supplied.  This spin-off conundrum
offers  a clear role for policy experimentation by public development authorities.
Skilled North-South Migration
Several points emerged from the survey and commentary  on the brain drain issues.  Arguments
were presented against using the idea of "education  as an exit-visa"  as a deliberate marketing
ploy to attract more young people into the sciences, engineering,  and the professions.  Some
people  may, nonetheless, go into these fields in order to emigrate, but it would hardly be
coherent or dignified for a country to adopt that stance as a national policy.
43Since there is already a diaspora for the countries  where the brain drain has been a problem, one
strategy is to foster transnational communities that will re-connect the diaspora in a positive
manner-rather than try to apply pressure for a binary return-or-not decision.
In addition to productively involving the existing diaspora, a country can try to reduce the
amount of the brain drain in the first place.  Here the policy discussion focused not on "hard"
(legal or financial)  restrictions but on educational reforms in analogy with Japanese-style  human
resource policies.  Countries, like companies, need to increase the retention of own-trained
people,  so these policy analogies are not surprising.  Along the lines of the educational reforms
suggested by Ronald Dore [1976;  1997]  for their own sake independently of the brain drain
problem, the general idea is to bring students earlier into public or private work organizations
(e.g., co-op programs) and then for further training, at home or abroad, to be undertaken or
financed by the organizations-ideas  in broad agreement with those of Don Patinkin [1968].
44Appendix  1: The Process of Development  According  to Jane Jacobs
Growth Versus Development
Development  is not just "growth" in the sense increased GDP income from remittances or natural
resources or even more inputs leading to more outputs.  Development  involves change through
differentiation,  diversification,  and transformation in the products and in the underlying
processes of production-all of which might be hidden in the black box of increased "total factor
productivity."  Similarly,  a vibrant city is not just a town with many more people and buildings
on a larger land area.
The notions of "growth" and  "development"  are sometimes used almost interchangeably,  but it
would be useful to our purposes to make a sharp distinction.  Jane Jacobs points out that there
was a sharp distinction even in biology.  In the history of embryology, there were two schools
about the. process of change from an embryo to a mature organism.  The "preformation"  school
(e.g., Aristotle)  saw the embryo  as just a tiny version of the mature organism so the process of
change was one of quantitative growth.  The epigenesis  school saw (correctly, as we now know)
the process of change as a qualitative process of differentiation and transformation.
Aggregate growth theory in economics  does a disservice to the understanding of development by
abstracting away from the difference between growth and development.  A similar "theory" of
biological growth as the increase in inputs leading to the increase in, say, body weight-plus
unspecified changes in something called "total input productivity"-would  not distinguish





45The biologist, C. H. Waddington,  described the "epigenetic  landscape" of development through
diversification as being more like a river delta than just a wider and deeper river.
One visual illustration  would be the very final edge between  the land and the sea
in a great river delta like those of the Mississippi  and the Nile-there  are almost
innumerable  little separate  rivulets  of the  fresh  water  running  down  to  the  sea,
separated quite definitely but only by low banks of mud. [Waddington  1977,  116]
Thus development involves not just "growth" but diversification  and ramification of different
products and different kinds of work which might take place, in part, within firms but also
through spin-offs, break-aways,  split-ups, and the like.  This "river delta" metaphor does not
picture all the web-like connections  between the diversified parts (e.g., as in an industrial district
or cluster) but it does carry us beyond the picture of "growth" in aggregate output.
On a preformation theory of city growth, a "city" would just be a quantitatively bigger version of
a small town, like a number of towns located together in a geographical  area. -But that is not
what vibrant cities are or how cities grow.  According to Jane Jacobs  [1969,  1984], it is more like
the process of epigenetic transformation, not blowing up a small balloon-with  more K and L-
to make a big balloon.  Although economists usually think in terms of the wealth of nations, she
takes cities and their regions as the units of economic development.
When is a Settlement like a Rain Forest or like a Desert?
A rain forest and a desert at the same latitude would have about the same amount of solar energy
arriving per unit area.  In the case of the desert,  it is essentially a sterile conduit; the energy
comes in during the day and is dissipated at night.  Little is captured; it is a through-put
operation.  The opposite is the case for the rain forest.  Much energy is captured through the
photosynthesis of its plants.  Then the stored energy is passed around in a complex web of
relationships  until it is finally dissipated.  Plants die and decay to feed other plants.  Plants are
eaten by animals who are eaten by other animals, who give off waste products, or who die and
decay to feed other organisms.
If we think of the imports coming into a settlement as being analogous to the incoming energy,
then, lacking the free energy of the sun, there must be some exports of commodities or services
to fund the imports.  The exports could be natural resource-based  as with oil, gas, or minerals or
they could be derived from agriculture.  The exports could be manufactured goods which might
ranged  all the way from just the assembly of imported parts/kits to goods that result from an
extensive chain of domestic value-added operations.  Or the exports could be some form of
services as in:  (1) a community supported by migrant workers, (2) a community supported by
tourism, (3)  a military base (seen as providing a public service),  (4) a retirement community
living off of pension income (past services), or (5)  a Bangalore-type operation (selling software
services) which might be part of a more complex operation of products and by-products.
Vibrant cities and the regions surrounding them are more like rain forests while some other
economic settlements are more like deserts.  A settlement is more like a 'desert' when the imports
are dissipated in consumption or are incorporated  directly into the production of what is
exported.  The settlement  is a rather straightforward economic conduit.
46A settlement is more like a 'rain forest' when the imports feed into a diversified web of local
value chains-some products being inputs into many other products and so forth.  The imports
spread out like a river delta to directly and indirectly feed a diverse 'ecology' of economic
activities.
The most sterile or inert desert-like settlements  are the settlements based essentially on direct
consumption  of imports such as communities living off of migrant worker remittances,
retirement communities living off pensions (and income from capital invested elsewhere),  and
military bases.  Not far behind are the settlements based on one stage of production with little
local value-added  and negligible local consumption  such as agricultural or natural resource-
based towns, tourist centers, casinos on Indian reservations in the United States, company towns,
and labor-intensive assembly or processing enclaves.  These are more like economic deserts
(with one type of cactus) than economic rain forests.
To become more ramified and complex, an economic settlement should have multiple uses for
imports to produce  diversified and multi-staged products with a significant part for local use.  In
a complex environment,  growth is not just an amplified through-put operation; it can lead to
development.  Each specialization  to achieve efficiency will soon lead to diversification of
outputs into various product niches, to backward integration to produce previously imported
inputs, and perhaps to unexpected  'matings' with nearby processes and products to produce novel
offspring.
Box 8. How Innovation turns "Growth" into Development
Jane  Jacobs  uses  the  development  of  the  3M  company  to  illustrate  how  innovation  turns  mere  growth
("expanding old work") into diversified and ramified development ("adding new work") in a process where  "one
sort of work leads to another"  [1969, 53].  The Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing  Company started with two
proprietors  and some workers  gathering and processing sands used for abrasive purposes.  Then they decided to
make  sandpaper  but had trouble  with  the  adhesives  to stick the sand to the  paper.  After  experimenting  with
adhesives, they developed a gummed paper to use as  masking tape for painters  and eventually  a whole line of
tapes:  "shoe  tape, electrical  tape,  acetate  tape,  pressure-sensitive  adhesive  tape (better  know as  Scotch tape),
acetate  fiber  tape,  cellophane  tape,  printed  cellophane  tape,  plastic  tape,  filament  tape,  sound  recording
magnetic  tape, nonwoven  synthetic  fibers."  [1969,  53]  Today we could add  a host of other spin-off products
such as the Post-it notes and magnetic disks for computers.3'
Other  uses  of  adhesives  were  not  forgotten.  The  diversification  continued  with  "sandblasting  stencils,
automotive  adhesives, industrial  adhesives,  marine adhesives,  marine caLking compounds,  tile and construction
adhesives,  construction compounds."  [1969,  53]  The original  product of sand also sent out its branches  on the
ramifying  tree  of products:  "coated  sand  for polishing,  then  wax  and  varnish  coatings,  finely  ground  paint
pigments,  roofing granules,  nonslip  cleats  and strips,  abrasive  cloth,  reflective  sheeting,  reflective  compounds,
paving materials, and welding fluxes."  [1969,  53]
This  process in which one sort of work leads to another  must have happened  millions  of times in
the whole history of human economic  development.  [Jacobs  1969, 53]
This is the  sort of innovation that tends to happen  when diverse people with various skills and complementary
34 See Collins and Porras 1994 to update the story of 3M as the "Mutation Machine from Minnesota."
47knowledge jostle together  in companies,  and  companies jostle  together  in  cities.  This  is an example  of the
dynamics  of agglomeration  that  goes beyond increases  in  "L"  and  "K"  and that goes  on  inside the expanding
black box of "total factor productivity."
The  sideways jumps  from  deepened  old  work  to  new  work  in  a  nearby  field  were  key  to  the  contagious
innovation that made the industrial revolution.
All  these gains, plus the invention of machines to build machines,  came together in the last third
of  the  eighteenth  century-a  period  of  contagious  novelty.  Some  of  this  merging  stream  of
innovation  may  have  been  a  lucky  harvest.  But  no.  Innovation  was  catching  because  the
principles that underlay a given technique could take  many forms, find many uses.  If one could
bore cannon,  one could  bore the cylinders of steam engines.  If one could print fabrics  by means
of cylinders  (as against the much slower block printing),  one could also print wallpaper  that way;
or print word text far faster than by the up-and-down strokes of a press and turn out penny tabloids
and cheap  novels  by the  tens  and hundreds of thousands.  Similarly, a modified  cotton-spinning
machine could spin wool and flax....  [Landes  1998, 191-2]
Adam Smith didn't get it right in  The Wealth of Nations.  Deepening  the division  of labor increases  operating
efficiency  and thus may expand old work but it is not the dynamics  of development of new work.
Dividing  existing  work  into  tasks  is  by no  means  confined  to  advancing  economies.  It is  also
practiced in  the most stagnant economies,  where men and women  spend their entire working  lives
at very  specialized  tasks:  tapping  rubber  trees,  or herding  goats,  or loading  bananas,  or twisting
fibers, or dancing  in temples,  or mining salt, or crushing ore,  or carrying baskets  of dirt for public
works,  or cultivating  corn and beans.  A stagnant economy  may lack almost everything,  but not
division of labor.  [Jacobs 1969, 83]
One key to dynamics is when the process  of deepening the division of labor in the old work leads to a new type
of work,  a new branch  on the tree.  Jacobs  illustrates  with  Smith's own example  of pin-making  [Smith  1994,
Chapter 1].  The  story of the improvements in pin-making started on an earlier  branch of the tree, the making of
wire bristles to card wool.  Specialization in making carding combs lead to people "who bought iron ingots from
smiths, drew them into wire, made the wire  into bristles and sold the bristles to cardmakers"  [Jacobs  1969, 82].
But the operations  of making the shaft of the  wire bristle were the same as those needed  to make the shaft of a
pin.  Hence some bristle makers could branch off with the further steps to add heads to the wire bristles to make
pins.  "They  were  adding  a  new  complexity,  pin making,  to  an  older simplicity,  bristle  making.  From  this
addition came the rest of the divisions of labor in pin making that Smith describes"  [Jacobs 1969,  82].
The  story of the dynamics of development is not the static efficiency of greater  specialization but the branching
off of new kinds of work.  Carrying the pin-making  story further, about fifty years after Smith's exposition,  the
hand-making  of pins  was rendered  obsolete  in a stroke  by  a pin-making  machine.  But that  machine  did not
develop  from the  specialization  of labor in the pin-making  business  but from a new branch  on another tree, a
new application made by a designer of machines for other industries.
35 The problem of using new knowledge (either an innovation  or new imported knowledge) to produce other
products off the main line of business  is related to what Norbert Wiener called  the "inverse process of invention."
Ordinarily we think of starting with a problem and then making an innovation or invention to solve the problem.
But with the new "solution"  in hand, we might then search for what other problems it might be able to solve.  "It is
just as truly a work of invention or discovery to find out what we are able to accomplish  by the use of these new
tools as it is to search for the tools which will make possible a specific new device or method." [Wiener  1993, 91]
48Piecemeal  Reconstruction to Acquire Technologies
How have late developers acquired technologies  from first developers in such a way that the
latecomers  can control the technology and develop it into the future?  Control over the
development of technologies  used in foreign-owned  enclave operations is not by any means
automatically transferred to the host country.  One way to acquire and adapt a technology is "the
hard way" instead of trying to leapfrog to an advanced stage by buying it whole from elsewhere
or inviting in a foreign operation.  Acquiring technologies through piecemeal reconstruction
creates the sort of rooted and 'owned' knowledge that would maximize the potential for multiple
off-shoots.
The development of the bicycle industry in Japan provides an example.  When bicycles were
imported into Japan around the turn of the 20  century, the first business was the repair business
based on cannibalizing some bicycles for spare parts [Jacobs  1969;  1984].  This was followed by
manufacturing  some needed parts locally and then the manufacture of enough parts so that whole
bicycles could be assembled there.
Not only did Japan  acquire bicycle  manufacturing  and develop  its own producers'
goods for the purpose as it went along, it also acquired  an improvised method  for
reproducing  other  types of complex  imported  goods  symbiotically  in  groups  of
individual  small  and  simple  factories,  a  method  put  to  use  for  manufacturing
sewing machines,  for example, and later radios and electrical  goods.  [Jacobs  1984,
148)
This shows how a late developer can acquire and adapt a technology in what at first looks like
"the hard way" but that it can then use what it has "learned how to learn" for other industries as
well.  This is the longer term benefit of not taking the short-cut of importing a factory.
At  the time  when  the  Japanese  developed  their  own  bicycle  manufacturing,  the
bicycles  they  imported  were  being  made  in  highly  integrated,  huge,  complete
factories in America,  as the sewing machines also were.  Had the Japanese  tried to
import complete  factories  for these purposes,  whether by buying them outright or
obtaining them on credit, they would have lost the opportunity of developing their
own producers' goods and production methods,  and the bicycles, sewing machines,
and  so  on,  would have  been  more expensive  as well,  probably too expensive  for
Japanese  to  buy.  Instead  they  used  their  trade  with  currently  more  advanced
economies only as a springboard for their own development.  [Jacobs  1984, 148-9]
In contrast, importing the technology  as a whole (e.g., through foreign direct investment) may
give a headstart but only down a narrow road.  Given the normal inertia of companies to continue
doing what worked in the past, spin-offs may facilitate diversification  into product niches, input
replacement, or the production of novel products.  Growth in volume will lead to further
specialization and then perhaps to more diversification,  replacement, and offspring, i.e., to
development.  But the original companies,  including foreign branch operations in a developing
country, usually do not reap all the gains from such spin-offs and break-aways  so such
development will tend to be under-supplied  [see box "The Spin-Off Conundrum"].
49If Japan had replaced its imports of sewing machines  merely by receiving  branch
plants  of  the  Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co.,  Japan  would  not  now  be  a  great
exporter of sewing machines,  nor of producers' good and services that started by
serving  local  sewing  machine  manufacturers.  Locally  originated  production  of
former imports  is often a slower  way for a city to acquire  new exports  from the
replacement  work  itself,  but  it  is  potentially  productive  of greater  and  more
various export work.  [Jacobs  1969, 2011
Box 9. The Spin-Off Conundrum
Spin-offs and break-aways  to fill nearby product niches are a positive externality of the mother firm and hence under
laissez-faire conditions may well be under-supplied.
Ordinarily  the owners  or managers  of a large firm would like  to own or control  a new  product line to  reap the
rewards.  But the  nearby product is "off'  of their original  line of products.  Expertise  in rather new  or different
products  is  not  what  got  the  managers  where  they  are  so  they  may  have  limited  enthusiasm  for  such  new
directions.  It may require  attention to a new  set of customers and  may require  some unfamiliar knowledge  and
inputs.  Managers  would  rather  "stick  to  their  knitting"  in  the  business  they  know  (e.g.,  bristle-making)  than
"wander off' into some other business (e.g., pin-making).
Picture,  for  example,  a  large  manufacturer  of metal  dies  whose  abrasive-sand  department  has
taken on the work of making  sandpaper  and masking  tape.  The personnel  department  has added
the  service  of  supplying  part-time  office  workers  to  banks  and  publishers.  One  group  of
machinists  has added the manufacturing  of toy cars.  Another group of machinists  has  added  the
manufacturing  of surgical instruments.  Still another  group is working on a machine  to improve
bookbinding.  The shipping department  has added  the  manufacturing  of crate linings made from
foam rubber and is also making shoe inner-soles from the scraps. [Jacobs  1969, 72]
Management  would  become  a nightmare  in this "strange  hive."  Each  new  kind of work would have its own
customers,  input  and  space  needs,  financing  and  staffing  requirements,  and  growth  rate  all  not  in  any
coordination  with  the original  work of the company.  It probably  is not  worth the  distraction  to the  original
company.  If the company  is a subsidiary or branch of a foreign or multinational firm and is intended to produce
the foreign  company's products  for the local  market,  then this sort of "irrelevant  diversification"  is even more
unlikely.  But it is a different  story to some local middle  managers and skilled  workers who could  see the  new
work as their own break-away enterprise.
This is the  "spin-off conundrum"  at the heart  of the problem  of business innovation  and  development.  Under
conventional  conditions, spin-offs  to pursue  new work and to fill adjacent product niches will tend to be under-
supplied-even though they will still occur  willy-nilly.  This is a problem even in developed economies,  but it
is particularly severe in developing countries where  business conditions  may be less welcoming but where such
spin-offs  would  be important  spillover  effects of otherwise  enclave  operations.  Regions,  countries,  and cities
that provide  the  investment climate  and  business  environment  to alleviate  the  spin-off conundrum  will  have
taken large strides along the road to development.
Climbing Jacobs' Ladder: Cities Developing  on Each Other's Shoulders
Cities can grow through a process of dynamic interaction with each other through direct or
indirect rivalry.  To play in the "game," a city must produce something which it can export-
perhaps based on its natural endowment.  That is its "challenge"  to other cities.  The export
50earnings can then buy imports from other cities that were not produced  in the given city-which
is its challenge.  If the other cities were not too advanced, then the import will present a plausible
challenge to be replaced through learning and improvisation  and perhaps improved upon by the
city.  Since the wealth to buy the imports might have been earned productively (not a gift), the
city might already  have some productive capacity that might begin to improvise and differentiate
to produce and replace the import [see box on "How Innovation turns 'Growth' into
Development"].
In the meantime,  the other cities might be replacing the original exports of the city; its temporary
advantage  might be competed  away.  Now the.domestic and perhaps improved version of the
originally imported products  can then be re-exported perhaps to.the original supplier city or more
likely to other cities that are less developed or have different specializations.  The new export
earnings will then purchase other more challenging imports, and the process can repeat itself
ratcheted up at a higher level.  In this matter, a diversified  group of innovative cities can through
trade learn from each other and not only grow but develop "on each other's shoulders"-climbing
Jacobs' ladder.
It should be particularly noted that the Jacobs' ladder mechanism works best between
competitors at roughly the same level of development.  "Science fiction" imports from advanced
countries would stop the rivalrous process in the same way that allowing a heavyweight to box in
a lightweight class would stop the rivalry and stop the associated process of learning and
improvement through competition-leaving aside any other damages.36 Enforcing "level playing
field" competition between "heavyweights"  and "lightweights"-that is, between advanced  and
underdeveloped countries-would be tantamount to "kicking away the ladder"  [Chang 2002] that
the developing  countries could climb.
Using Temporary Migration to Kickstart Development
How might temporary migration help local development  get started rather than serve to
perpetuate an economically barren "bedroom"  community living off of remittances?  The Jacobs'
ladder mechanism starts with some export such as labor or a natural resource which can then
fund imports that serve as a challenge to local production.  For instance, temporary labor
migration might result in a number of workers having the funds to buy building materials for
new homes.  But instead of the through-put operation of remittances going back out to buy
imported building materials, the opportunity might be used to supply some of the initial demand
from a local operation producing bricks or lumber or some other materials for the homes.  But
the remittances  should fund only the capital and the initial  demand to bootstrap  the business.
The operation should seek to quickly re-export building materials to nearby towns to wean the
operation  away from the temporary  remittances.
It would be helpful if the temporary labor migration served not only to supply an initial demand
and capital but the knowledge to run the operation.  This is why migration  to a slightly more
advanced region might be more helpful than migration to a "science fiction"  region where the
learning might have less application back home.
36 See Chapter  10 "Why Backward  Cities Need One Another"  in Jacobs 1984.
51The initial business might start as a relocation  of a low-end maquila operation that had employed
the temporary migrants  in a more advanced region.  Or it might start by using old machinery that
was being replaced in the more advanced region.  Here again, the goal should be to gain control
over the operation so that the sources of demand and the products could be diversified away from
dependence on being just a link in a value chain based elsewhere.
Once an operation is mastered, then the town should seek to diversify into related products where
the same or similar knowledge and skills could be used.  A temporary labor stint in a similar
operation elsewhere might be helpful.  Climbing this first rung on the ladder is more feasible if
the town is relatively close37 to a thriving city so that volume can grow and new diversified
products will find a ready market.
Appendix 2: Picturing the Dynamics of Convergence  and Divergence
Picturing the Dynamics  of Convergence
A diagram using two labor demand curves can represent an equalizing dynamics between two
regions  ("rich" and "poor")  that is driven by wage differentials.
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Figure A3: "How World Migration Reduces Poverty"
[Source:  Figure 1 in Williamson 2003]
The vertical axis on the right is the wage scale in the poor country and the labor Lpoor is
represented on the horizontal axis as increasing right to left.  Thus the demand curve for labor
Dpoor in the poor country is represented  "backwards"  sloping "downward" right to left.  The total
labor between the two countries is the length of the horizontal axis.  At the initial pre-migration
equilibrium, the wage is Wrich in the rich country and Wp,or in the poor country.  When the gate
between the two labor reservoirs is opened, then the equalizing flow of labor from poor to rich
country is the indicated migration that equalizes the wage rate in both countries at W*.  By
comparing the equilibrium wages before and after the migration, we can compute the "Residents'
Loss" for the original workers in the rich country, the "Movers' Gain" for the migrants, and the
"Stayers' Gain" for the workers who stay in the poor country.
37  As we see from Bangalore,  "close" need not be interpreted in physical terms when the imported inputs and
exported products are informational.
52This illustration of the "dynamics" of convergence is a comparative statics diagram that
represents two equilibria (and not the dynamics in between).  From the viewpoint of our
discussion, the key assumption is that there are no economies of agglomeration  or
disagglomeration  in either country, an assumption embodied in the "partial equilibrium"
representation of the demand for labor curves being the same in spite of a significant medium-
term shift in population from one country to the other.  The alternative assumption will be
considered in the next section.
Another dynamics of convergence is that given by the reaction curve model.  Let us model a
two-location world, say group A and group B.  Each of a fixed number of individuals is in one
group or the other.  The reaction function gives the information,  given that X% are in group B,
Y% are willing to be in group B.  But in a two-group world, the reaction function can also be
read as saying, given (100-X)% in A, (100-Y)%  are willing to be in group A.  Then the reaction
function dynamics between the two groups can be represented in a box or, in this case, square
diagram reminiscent of the Edgeworth box diagram.  The reaction curve from group A's point of
view has its origin at the northeast corner of the square.
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Figure A4: Reaction  Square with Dynamics of Convergence
Whether looked at from the viewpoint of group A or group B, there is a unique and stable
equilibrium  where the reaction curve crosses the 450 line.  Given  an exogenous shock that moves
it away from the equilibrium, the dynamics  will restore it.
Picturing the Dynamics  of Divergence
It was previously noted that the comparative  statics model pictured in Figure A3 assumes no
economies of agglomeration or disagglomeration  as the labor shifts from one country to the
other.  These economies and diseconomies go beyond the general equilibrium multiplier effects
that are usually ignored in the partial equilibrium comparative  statics approach.  Cities (or
Marshall's industrial districts) may exhibit such economies.  As labor comes in to satisfy
demand,  other medium-term dynamics  are set in motion.  As firms expand volume, they may
53diversify into new product lines which would shift the demand for labor.  Or some operations
may spin off from expanding large firms, and the renewed vigor of the spin-offs may shift the
demand for labor.38 Some "resident" workers as well as some migrants may decide to go into
business for themselves which also shifts demand.  Those are some of the dynamics of
agglomeration  [see box  "How Innovation turns 'Growth' into Development"  in Appendix 1 for
examples  of the dynamics of development to which in-migration can be a contributing factor].
On the sending side, there may also be medium-term dynamic effects.  Some firms might
collapse in the face of rising costs or the loss of key personnel to the North which, in turn, may
have a knock-on effect on the viability of related firms (suppliers or customers).  In fact, some
migrants may have themselves been proprietors of micro-businesses.  These effects would shift
the labor demand downward in the sending country, part of the dynamics of disagglomeration  or
ghettoization.  Remittances would have an opposing multiplier effect to induce an increase  in
labor demand (at least where the money is spent).  But that demand would collapse if workers
returned to take remittance-funded jobs unless the remittances were used in some Jacobs' ladder
manner to create jobs not dependent on remittances.  Remittances might also have the negative
effect of inspiring and funding the migration of additional family members.  In the absence of
positive developmental changes, one would expect remittances to only mitigate and not reverse
the downward shift.
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Figure A5: How North-South Migration Might Worsen the North-South Divide
Figure A5 represents three equilibria.  When the labor gates are opened, the separate equilibria
given by Wrich and Wpoor would lead to the first wave of migrants from the poor to the rich
country.  But the dynamic agglomerative  effects of the migration would shift the labor demand
curve Drich outward to D'rich in the rich country, and the ghettoizing effect in the poor country
would shift the labor demand curve Dpoor downward to D'Pwr.  This would still leave the wage
differential between W'rich  and W'poor so there would be a second wave of migrants,  and so forth.
The size of the shifts is drawn so that the wage in the poor country W'P,,r after the I"  wave of
migration is still higher than the original wage Wpo,r.  The ghettoizing effect in the South is
shown by the lower level of labor demand at each wage level, i.e., the overall drop in economic
38Nature thrives by having old growth constantly seeding new growth rather than just expanding the old growth.
54activity, even though the remaining workers may get higher wages.39 Long before this dynamics
of divergence worked its way out, politics in the rich country would probably close the gates.
The net effect of the intervening migration episodes would be agglomeration in the rich country
and ghettoization in the poor country leaving the North-South divide worse than before-a
contributing factor to "divergence, big time" [Pritchett  1997].
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Figure A6: Reaction Square with Dynamics of Divergence
There are two stable equilibria: A, where most everyone  is in group A, and B where the groups
are more evenly split but with the most in B.  If the system was at B, then a large enough
exogenous shock such as enough poaching by group A from group B would increase the
percentage  in group A (and correspondingly  decrease it in group B) to beyond the critical  mass
point C, so that mass migration is sponsored to push the system to the new equilibrium at A.
Most everyone is in group A, and group B has been ghettoized to a small remnant of diehards.
Appendix 3: Multi-Person Prisoners' Dilemma Games
The standard two-person prisoners' dilemma game illustrates  a symmetrical  situation where each
play has a choice of "cooperate" or "defect"  and that no matter what the other player does it is
best for each play to defect.  Thus both would defect; yet the outcome of both defecting is worse
for both of them than the outcome of both cooperating.
Illustrative payoffs are given in the following  figure.
39 For a dramatic example,  suppose a group of doctors in a hospital are attracted away to hospitals in the North in a
package  deal.  Although the hospital may be nearly collapsing around the remaining doctors, the immobile wealthy
in the town or city would then  be willing to pay more to guarantee  their services.
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Figure A7: Two-Person  Prisoners' Dilemma Game
The game can be "regraphed"  in a way that can then be generalized  to a multi-person game.
1
Defect  0  Cooperate
-1  "I cooperate"
Figure A8: Re-Graphed  Two-Person Prisoners' Dilemma Game
The two sloping lines  "I defect"  and "I cooperate"  give the results from either player's viewpoint
depending on what the other player does.  The other player is either at the left end (Defect) or the
right end (Cooperate) of the horizontal line.  The fact that no matter what the other player does, it
is better for a player to defect is indicated by the "I defect" curve being always  above the "I
cooperate" curve.  Yet if both defect, each gets 0, whereas if both cooperate, each would get a
payoff of 1.
In figure A9 representing a multi-person  game with n+1  players, the horizontal  line is of length
n.  A point such as m along the line represents the players who cooperate-so  that n-m are the
number of defectors.  The two sloping lines give the payoffs to any player given the assumed
number of other players who defect or cooperate.  Thus the vertical  line at m intersects the  "I
cooperate"  and "I defect" lines at the points giving the payoffs to the "marginal player"  (which
could be any player).  Since the "I defect"  curve still dominates  the "I cooperate" curve no matter
what the other m players do, it is still in the interest of each player to defect.  But that gives them
each a payoff of 0 whereas universal cooperation would give each a payoff of 1.
The universal defection point is arbitrarily taken as the origin.  The point k is significant;  it is the
minimum "coalition  of the cooperating"  so that their payoff will exceed the universal defection
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Figure A9: Multi-Person Prisoners' Dilenima Game
There is no need for the payoff curves  to be straight lines but we will keep that just for
simplicity.  The "dilemma" is in the game as long as the "I defect" curve is always above the "I
cooperate" curve.
In the next figure, the migration decision in some region is interpreted  as a multi-person
prisoners' dilemma game.  This model is about a simple stay or leave decision.  There are no
remittances  or return migrations.  The payoff curves give a simple economic return to the
individuals (or families).
III migrate" 
Migrate  0  k  n Stay
"I stay"
Figure AIO:  Migration as a Multi-Person  Prisoners' Dilemma Game
Note that we have assumed diminishing returns to migration.  As more migrate, the payoff to
each is reduced-which  could be interpreted as a tightening of controls at the receiving end and
thus a raising of the costs of migration.  The payoff to each when all migrate is taken as the zero
point.  Then k represents the minimum number of stayers so that each stayer got at least the
universal migration payoff.  But with each proportion of stayers and migrants, it is always in the
individual interest of the marginal player to migrate.  Yet the result of all migrating is dominated
by the outcome where all stay.
57These prisoners' dilemma models of collective action situations typically do not represent the
whole situation  since collective  action does take place  [see Hirschman 1982].  The game might
represent the situation absent a law to require cooperation  (e.g., paying taxes) or absent some
social sanction against defection or some social preference for cooperative action.  For instance,
the migration example might represent the individual economic payoffs absent any social
disapprobation against leaving.  Different individuals might have different susceptibilities to
social sanctions so analysis quickly becomes complicated.
The migration version of the multi-person prisoners'  dilemma game is used here only to make a
simple point about the cosmopolitan liberal position that each individual should choose the
option that betters the individual's position.  That is not good policy advice in a prisoners'
dilemma situation.
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